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CHAPTER I
DECISION-l~AKING

INTRODUCTION: TOHARDS A THEORY OF GROUP

Nothing is so useful as a good theory.
-Kurt Le\'ti n
The good theory is useful as an aid in understanding the phenomenon
of the empidc:al world.

Understanding is aided by the generation

of hyp otheses about phenomenons which can be tested.

If the

hypothes is is confirmed, then we can cautiously hegin to genera li ze
about the pheno10enon we observe (Si nqer , 13) .
Tvtelve years ago Sidney Verba wrote of the dismal state of
political theory and of the contribution group theory could make :
The i mmediate need in political resea rch is not for
more facts or more data : rather, it is for adequate
conceptual s chemes and systematic theories into
which fit the facts we have and the facts we shal l gather
in the future. ... Small qroup a.n:dysis can contribute
to those broad theoretical ••. interes ts of political
science (Ve rba~ 4).
Thi.;; paper attempts to pt·ov·i de a

sy~;temat i

decision-making into vthich to fit facts
Bay of Pigs and the Cuban

The

proces~

~l"iss ile

\"le

c t heory of group
have concerning the

Cr·is·is dedsions.

of fittinq the facts of past events into a

theoretical fr·amm"ork i s, in
facto exper·i ment . 11

~J . D.

Singe r's

\'lOI"ds, th <~

11

ex post

Events are not observed as they occur nor

are variables controll ed during the occm·rence of the events.
Rath erv the records, observations t end other

tr~ccs

of events

are re vi cv1e d ·in an effort to understand why and hov1 the event
occurred as it did.
Accord·i nq'iy, t hi s paper beg·i nr. vd til an i nt 1·oducti on to the
1

forces shaping and limiting the study of political decision making.

In Chapter Two a theory of the process of group decision -

making based on behavioral research is fonnulated.

In subsequent

chapters the theory is applied to the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban
Missile Crisis decisions.

Finally, the concluding chapter

attempts to draw together· and to summat·i ze the theory and its
application.
The Jraditional

~1ach:

The

11

Rational Act or

~1odel

11

This study of poli t ical decision-making stressing the process
of decision --making in a group sett ing is, in part, a reaction
against traditi onal approaches of political rutalysis.
The study of internuti onal rel ations is ove rburdened \'lith
historical studies of the interaction

bet\~een

states.

The classic

appt·oach to the study of a given de ci s ·ion by one govemment
effecting anothcl· mi9ht be call ed the
Thi s mode l tr·eats the state as

tiH~

11

rationa1 actor modcl 11 •

entity reaching the decis ion.

The decision itself is seen as behavi or th at refl ect s a r ational

purpose or in tent.

The centra1 concepts of the model center·

around the calcul ated \'le i ghing of goa·ls , alternati ves, consequences ,
an d cho·ices.

The .. rati onal actor' model" i s the dorrrinant method of

current political ana lys i s (Snyders Bruck , and Snpin, 50 an d
All s ion~

38).

I will i mp li citly contend in this paper th at the conce pt of
for·~:rlgn

poli cy as a r at'iona·l process of

sett in9

a lt emat·i ves ~

gatherin ~l

in fot·mati on ,

an d making dec·is i ons i s not an
2

~.de quate

tool of understanding.

In fact, the .. rational actor model .. does

not make sense out of much political phenomenon (Gelb and Halperin,
28).

I will directly contend in this paper that a process model

of political decision-making provides an adequate and helpful tool
for the understanding of political decisions.
The Process Model
The focus of the process model is upon the individual decisionmakers in group settings and the process of interaction among them.
Theorists in the fields of political science and psychology have
contributed ideas which shape the process model.
In the early sixties political scientists burst forth with
a numbe1" of theories about the process of decision-making.
differing on many

impm~tant

Hhile

factors, these theor-ies shared some

common ol'i entati ons \<Jhi ch differ fr·om the classic approaches.
First, the focus was on the individual as deci sion -maker (Allison,
The state was defi ned as its official decision-makers whose

144).

acts

at~e

the acts of the . state (SnydE! r, Bruck, and Sapi n, 65).

The individual v1as recognized as operating in an organi zational

and group context \'lhi ch shaped hi s behavior (Snyde r, Bruck~ and
Sapin, 103-"104 <tnd North, ct al, 10).
A second change in politi cal thinking emphas ized by the
process mode l is ·interaction among individual s in the decision making setting.

Rich ard Neustadt's class i c study of Pres ident·ial

power· focus e d upon the po\'Jer res ou nes ava'ilable to the de cisionma~ e r.

Nt~u s tadt t~ecognized

that thr. behaviot· of politic··llHlkers
3

is a result of pov1er interaction, not rational design (Neustadt,
179-183}.

Roger Hilsman, both before and after his service in

the Kennedy admi ni strati on, deve 1oped a mode 1 of po1i tics 'rlhi ch
stressed the conflicts between decision-makers and the efforts
to achieve consensus.

For Hilsman, politics is the process of

decision-making, of consensus building, and of conflict resolu- .
tion in group settings (Hilsman, 1959, 365-366 and 1971, 117 and
135).

These political scientists brcv.ght new focus on the indi-

vidual as decision-maker and on

p~ver

as the means of conflict

resolution and consensus building (Allison, 144-162).
While some political scientists have recognized the importan ce of psychological considerations in understanding the individual decision -maker (s ee North, et al, 9-10, for example), it

was the psychologi sts who brought such considerat ions fully
into vi el'l.

!

Ear'ly work concet·ned with psychological factors v1as

often nat·t·ow1y limited (Kelman , 1965, 4-7) and frequent ly of l ow

qua 1i ty {Rosenau, 509).

Psycho 1ogi s t Joseph de Ri veri a has

exhaustively studied five major post-war decisions .

De Ri ve ri a

focused upon the individual decision-maker in a group settin g

(de Riveria, 212-213).

His work provi des support for the f ocus

upon the indi vi dual as the central decision-maker.

asserted that the extern a1 forces and

,~at i

De Riveria

on a1 cons iderations of

th e cl ass ic approach are relevant only as seen through the eyes

of the deci s ion -make r (de Riveri a, 11-17) .
De Riveri a •s \•lark \'l as heavi ·ly infl uenced by an earli er

~;tudy

by ,Jerome Frank. Frank •s analysi s \'las mot·e ori ented tuwards the
4

interaction betv1een states than towards the psychology of individual
decision-makers;

h~1ever,

Frank offered many psychological insights

relevant to an understanding of the individual as decision-maker
(Frank, 6).
Frank and de Riveria suggest a third principle for the process
model.

The process of power exercise takes place within a pet·cep-

tual context v-Jhich individuals largely create themselves.
De Riveria's book exerted some influence of its own on Irving

Janis.

Janis' book uses five post-\'tar political decisions as the

substance of his analyses.

Janis is much less theoretically

analytical than de Rivel'ia or Frank.

His theory is simply that

amiability or cohesiveness in a group of po 1icy-makers reduces
independent thinldng and results in i1·rational and dehumanizing
actions (J anis , 1972, 198-199).

Thus, Janis suggests a fourth

principle of the process model: the perceptual context of decis ion
is shaped by the cohesive gt·oup.
Thus, t he process model di ffers ft·om the 11 r ational actor
model" in stressing four concepts.

First, the ind·i vi dua~ on-

maker is the foca1 point of study. Second, the exercj.sa.Qj~1er
.. ...,.--...-.----..-,
is the means of conflict resolution and cons ensus building which
.. -· . .. -------··--·------------is the essence of political decision-making. Third, the exerci se
~...._

_______

_,

r' " ... -

,,_ ..., • •. ~..-· · -..,..

••• , ,.,,._,._ --..., ,~, -•

-.,

of po·net· ta kes place within a perccpt_u_(!_l
by ·indivi duals.

Fourth~

~ontext

large ly cteated

in dividual s create this perceptual

conte'xt \'li thin cohes ive groups.

These four concepts form the

basis of the process mode l and \'Jill be developed in Chapte r ·f\·10.

5

of Pigs anq the Cuban_ f·1 issile Crisis:
The Limitations of App lication

The~

History depends on who writes it.
-John Kennedy
The inaccuracy of most \4ashi ngton diaries
and autobiographies is surpassed only by
the irrmodesty of their authors.
-Theodore Sorensen
Taken together, the statements by Kennedy and Sorensen are
notable because the bulk of history about the foreign policy of
the Kennedy administration Has \'lritten by members of the Administration .

Information on the Kennedy years is primarily based

upon books by Schlesinger, Sorensen, Robert Kennedy, Hilsman,
Salinger, and a deluge of less figures, including cooks, maids,
secrctari es, et cetet·a.

Only recently have books dra\'li ng on

intervie\·ls of less sympathetic insidet"S surfaced (for examp le,
those by Halbersttam and Allison).
The res ult of the r·ather one-sided version of history on the
Kennedy ye ars is a schol ar·ly skepticism and caution.

Certai nly,

one cannot take the t ation alized t1·eatment given to Bay of Pigs
by most Kennedy insiders as l"eflective of the actual course of
events.

One le arns t o t ake vlith appr·opriate amou nts of salt the

fuithfu'l accounts by Sorensen, \'rith appropriate t-es pect tile more
ins·ightful accounts by Schlesinge1·, and with app1·opri ate p·leasure
the more critical accounts by Ha.l berstt am and

~J a lton.

In short ,

all the ne ces sary ctata may not ba availabl e, but certainly enough
data are availabl e to test a theory.
6

But 'tlho \'/rites the history is not so important as who
interprets the data.

Allison's use of three different conceptual

models in studying the missile crisis well illustrates the importance of finding the best way to look at the same set of events.
Janis has taken a perspective which applies group dynamics theory
to a series of political decisions. Sorensen argues that one
cannot validly apply research

fru~

the more mundane aspects of

life to the exalted setting of Presidential decision-making
(Sorensen, 1963, 11-12).
The appropriateness of application of research data taken
from various settings to the arena of Presidential decision -making
is

SQ~ething

of a mute point. Sidney Verba, after spending a

thi1·d of his book just ifying limited application, ends by saying
something \'lhicll sounds like "if the shoe fits ••. " (Vet ba , 61-109).
Vetba's case for trying the shoe on goes as follows:
One of the standa1·ds ty which the applicab ility
of the research in one area to an other can be
judged is whether or not the findin gs in one
area confir·m gene ral theori es developed in the
other. Propositions developed on the basis of
studies in one field of social research gain
greater vali dity if they can be fitted into
systematic theories devel oped in anothe r field
(Verba, 101).

7

OiAPTER II
A THEORY OF GROUP DECISION-MAKING
I speak without exaggeration \'/hen· I say that
I have constructed three thousand different

theories .... Yet in only two cases did my
experiments prove the truth of my theory.
-Thomas Edison
Hopefully, this theory wi 11 reflect more success than the
2,998 failures of Thomas Edison.

The theory outlined below is

aimed at providing greate r understanding of the process by which
a group reaches a specific decision.
An understanding of the process of group decision-making

might Hell begin vii th the end and work backwards tovtards the
beginning.

The idea behind this back\'lardness is that if vte knao'l

at what point the group is and from what point it stat·ted, then
vte might knm·1 hov1 it got there.

The

pt~ocess

of unde1·standing

has three steps.

(1) Cohes ive groups develop pressures towards uni f ormity

of opinion on any given issue.

'fhe group arrives at th·is end

by the appli cation of conformity pressures on de viant members.
(2) The direction of the conformity pressures is determined

by the effective exercise of pm·ter \'li th in the gl'oup.

That is,

confot'ini ty pr·ess ures v1i 11 be brou9ht to bear upon the \'Ienker
member-s by the more
pm-1er
\'l'i

\'li

pm·;e!~ful

members.

Those \'!ho exercise greatest

11 determine the parti cul al' goa i t oward Hhi ch conformity

11 be directed.

Those \':ho poss ess l ess po'lter \'Ji 11 be pressured

to conform in the direction of the position of the powerful.
(3) The effective exercise of pm'ler is determined by indivi;;

dual and group perceptions and expectations.

First, the individual

power holder must perceive that an opportunity for power exercise
exists.

We must feel that we can use our pO't'ter towards some parti-

cular end.

Second, the individual must exercise power only in

appropriate situations if the exercise of power is to be effective.
Our roles, patterns of interaction, and psychological ori entations
limit the

11

rightness" or appropriateness of power usage.

Th ·i rd,

the individual must perceive the exercise of power to be, on
bal ance , desirub le.

In short, in cohesive groups the end of the decision process
is conformity.

The di rection of confonnity press ures is

mined by the effective exercise of povte t'.
pm'let~

deter~

And the exercise of

is, in tlml, determined by i ndi vi dua 1 and group perceptions

and expectations.
Cohesi ve . Group~ ~l2P.. f.!:_~ssures_ Towa rds_
Con fo l~m·t t.l_ _
gf Opi n·t on_~! G1 ven _I_E_s_ue
Our wretched spcci es is so made that those
who \ltalk on the 'lle ll ~ tro dde n path al l'lays
thl'OI·J stones at t hose who are sh01.,ring a nm-1
road.
- Voltaire
The proces s of stone" t hrovling i s a l ess subtle form of
conformity press urin g than t hat employed by most groups.

Con··

fonnity is si rnp'ly t he uniformity of opinion amonu membe rs in a
group.

Cohes i vcness i s t he sum of

9

an

tile bonds l'lh i ch attract an

individual to the group.

Cohesiveness might include, but is not

limited to, identification \·l ith the group, interpersonal attraction
within the group, the desirability of the group's activities, et

.."

cetera.

While we may not be able to precisely measure cohesiveness,

we have a clear idea of its broad nature (CartHright, 91; Festinger,
1968, 185; and Collins and Guetzkow, 129-130}.

Becnuse the indi-

vidual \'lishes to remain in a group he .is subject to pressut·es to
conform.

Cohesion is, then, the source of a group's power to force

confot111i ty.
The proposition that individuals tend to conform to the
opinions of the group is one of the best documented generalizations
in small group resenrch l iterature.

In both

on~going

and experi-

menta 1 gr·oups, researchers have found that i ndi vi dua 1s wi 11 change
thei l' vi C\'15 to confonn to the domin an t group opinion.
results reg ardl ess of the

11

correctness 11

opinion (Verlia, 22 and Janis, 1972, 5).

Ol"

Conformity

validity of the group

He are clearly reluc-tant

to stand alone against the opinions of our peers.

A wide variety of research datu supports the conclusion that
cohesiveness increases conformity in gt..oups.

~1emb ers

of mO\"e

cohesive groups both more re adily initi ate and accept infl uence
attempts th an members of 1css cohes ive groups .

The cohesive group,,

then, attempt s more confo rmi ty pressutes than t he non-cohesive
group.
more

And. in turn , the membc1·s of the cohes ive gr·oup respond

,~ea dily

to the increased pressures for unifonnity ( Cartwright,

104; Collins and Guetzkm-1, 129- 130 ; Festinger, Schachter, and Back,
152·· 164; Schachte r, 1 65~ 1 66; nnd Festinqct·, 1968, 185 ).

10

Increases in Cohesiveness
Cohesiveness increases if the group shares a common fate
or experiences increased stress.
(1) Research of groups sharing a common fate points to an

increase in interpersonal attractiveness and thus cohesiveness.
Similarly, if the group is treated as an entity in terms of
external re\'tards or punishments, group cohesiveness will increase
(Collins and Guetzkow, 140- 143). The cohesion-building effects
of shared fate are demonstrated by the closeness of oppressed
groups \'lho are treated as an entity by the oppressors.
(2) Leaders of nations wishing to avoid the pitfalls of their

follies are fond of creating or using a crisis in order to solidify
the nation around them.

Actually, this process is an example of

the cohesion-building qualities of increased stress . A mass of
t•esearch data points to increases in group solidarity, integration,
cooperation, friendliness, et cetera, in response to stressful
situations (Janis, 1968, 80; Hambin, 221; and Lanzetta, 217).
Research by Hambin, however, seems to contradi ct the p1·evious
studies by showing a decrease in group integration or cohesiveness
during a cris is.

In seeking to explain the unexpected results,

Hambin r-evi ei·ted the previous

li tet~ature.

The rcviev1s and llambin's

own study point to an increase in cohesiveness during a crisis
only if a likely cooperati ve solution is pet'ceived by the group.
If a li kely solution is unavailable, the cohesiveness \'Jill decl'ease
(llambin, 230) .

11

Increases in Conformity Pressures on the De vi ant
Conformity pressures on the deviant increase with the importance ot relevance of the issue, the discrepancy of opinion, and
the status of the deviant.

t
J

( 1) Conformity .eressures 2!!. th~ de vi ant increase ~ the

relevance and importance of.. the issue to the group increases.
The relevance and importance of an issue for a group is a matter
of ordering priorities.

Regardless of the basis for the ordering,

the group clearly exercises greater influence in matters perceived
as relevant to the group {Schachter, 166 and Festinger, 1968, 184).
Less relevant or less important issues probably do not offer as
great a possibility for conflict over basic values, goals, or
perceptions as do i ssues of more centrul concern.
(2) .£onformity "ressures on _!:Jle deviant increase~ ~ce ived

deviance

.inc.!:_(!_~~~

As the discrepancy in opinion beb1een the

devi ant member and the group increases , conformity pressures are
stepped up (Festinger, 1968, 185 ).

r,n

initi al increase in colT1nuni"

cation t o t he deviant is the prime vehicle for conformity pressures.
Although the initial res ponse to deviance may be incl'ease d comrnuniC.:ltion d'irt1ctf!d tm,tards the deviant, continued dev ian ce may result
in reduced crnnmunication and/or psychological rejection from or
i s olation within the gr0up (Schachter , 166 ).
inten!d ty of the corr.muni cated conformity

The amount and

p ress m~es

increase as the

di scrzpuncy bebtcen gtoup and deviant vlidens ( Co11ins and GuetzkoH,
179- 180).
( 3) Q~.fE!Jl}j.!l £!:!:.SS ~~- .~.!.!£~~~~ .~~ .~.~~~. ~.~!!~

12

.9i..t ile

devi ant

increases.

The higher the i ndividual's status, the greater will

be the pressures for his conformity to group norms.

The greater

influence and centrality of highly ranked persons results in an
increased amount of influence and communication flowing

t~~ards

them (Hopkins, 65-67}.
The high status individual,

ha~ever,

may be more resistant

to conformity pressures than the low status individual.

High

status individuals build up "idiosyncracy credits" on the basis
of past behavior
31}.

\~hich

permit great deviance (Jacobson, 26 and

Leaders typically accrue mot·e "idiosyncracy credits" which

allow deviance at less cost (Jacobson , 133}.
Hhile leaders and other high status members are more resistant to a given conformity press ure than 101·1 status members, the
high status individua1 must fa.ce !!!2.!'!!.. confotiility pressures th an

the low st&.tus indivi dua·l.

For example, the l eader's

representa~

ti ve functi on and his l eyi timacy based on group nonns combine with
hi s centt·al position in the comnunication network to assure
greater conformity press u1·es than the non-leader

(Verba~ 185- 189).

Cohesive gr·oups deve 1op press m·es tm'la rds conformity on a
given issue.

The group, in Eff ectt directs devi an ts to move

tm·tat·ds the policy of t he group.

The particul ar policy tovtards

vthi ch de vi ants Hill be di 1·ected is de te1·mi ned by the hi e1·a 1·chy of
poHer within the group.
The Di 1·ecti on of Conformi tv Press ure i s Determined
!fr. ~li~. ~Trecffve Grc1se o(PoweflTfff.i:i_n_ the ~
P m~er

i s defined in a behav·iora1 context.
13

An agent has pO\•Ier

over a reci pi en t

\'I

hen the acts of the agent can modify the behavior

of the recipient.
by the agent.

Po~1e r

P~'ier

may exist without being overtly exercised

is simply the potential to modify another's

behavior (Collins and Guetzkow, 121 - 122; Raven and French, 400).
Implicit in the concept of power is the power recipient's
perception of his dependence on
power agent.

son~

resource possessed by the

or

The agent has power because the recipient wants

needs sorrething the agent possesses.

The dependence of the pO\'Ier

t·e ci pi ent upon the agent increases \>lith the recipient •s 11 moti vational investrnent 11 in t he goals mediated by t he agent.

The more

important the resource possessed by the agent to the recipient,
the

gt~eater

recipi ent

the agent 1 s power.

decreasr~s

The dependence of the pm•1er

\'lith the ava·il abil ity of the resource to the

reci pi ent outside of the agent-recipi ent relationship.
words~

the

~gent•s

In other

povwr- is l essened if the recipient can obtain

the des ired resource elsevthere (Emerson, 32 and Jacobson, 2u3 and
66~67).

This concept of dependency of the

,~e cipient

on the resources

of the agent as the essence of power 1eads to an ell)phas is on both
the t"esources of the agent and the responses of the rnci p·i ent.
The exercise of

pm•Jel~, then~

i s a process including both the

pm<~er

attempt by the agent and the po\'ter res ponse by the red r>i ent.
£_~ r

and__£'..2.1~
Samuel Johnson said, amo ng many other things, th at "power

is not suffic-ient evidence of t r uth."
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Hovleve t~ ,

it is suffici ent

evidence to convince many people of the truth.

Individuals conform

to the policy desired by the povterful not out of some higher knOI'tledge of truth, but by the force of powe.-.

Surely, truth may be

power, but povter as often begets beliefs \•thich we believe to be true.
Hilsman defines politics as the exercise of povter on behalf of
policies by groups of people.
as the result of power.

He sees the outcome of a policy debate

In short, "policy making is a political

process . " And the political process is largely a powe r process
(Hilsman, 1971, 117 and 135).
So defined, politics becomes not the narrow concern of thos e
studying government ,. but the operation of powet' in any decisionmaking context.

Decisions are not made according to some fo rma1

rul e-book est ab li shing the laws and logic of decision-maki ng .
Deci s i ons made in groups involve people stt'iving for both conflict ing
i ntet·es t s and mutua1
group wan t s.

con s ensu s - ~for

\·that they \'.' ant cmd fo r what t he

These i ndividual s possess di fferent a.moun ts of povte r.

The resolut i on of t heir rm·te r di f ferenti als det ermines t he di rect·ion
of con form i ty for the group.

The group vti ll exe t·ci se confo rmi ty

press ures on dev·i ant s to move tO\·tards the po li cy option of the
mos t pm•tetful membe t"s (Jacobson , 95 and 11 4).
Povter

l~es out'ces

The di fferent types of po',oter refl ect t he var·i ous resou rces

ava il ab l e to t he povHH' agent .

int o fi ve br oad t ypes.

The concept of powe r may be divi ded

Fir·st , rewat·d po\'ter i s based on the

r ec i pi e nt ' s pe r ce ption that t he agent has t he abili ty to
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re~'lard

him.

The recipient is dependent on the agent for the provision

of positive valences.

Second, coercive po\'ter is based on the

recipient's perception that the agent has the ability to punish
him.

The recipient is dependent on the agent for the avoidance

of negative valences.

Third, legiti mate

pm<~er

is based on the

recipient's pel·ception that the agent has a legitimate right to
influence hi m by virtue of the agent's position.

The recipient

is dependent upon the agent due to the r ecipient 1 s 0\'m internali zed acceptu.nce of the "oughtness" of the agent's povte r position.
Fourth, referent pm1er i s bas ed on the recipient' s identification
\·tith the agent.

The re cipi ent is dependent upon the agent due to

the recipient' s identification with the agent's person.

Fifth,

expert pm•te r i s base d on t he re cipient' s pet·ception that th e agent
pos s esses speci a l kno\'tl edge , s kills, or abiliti es .

The recipi ent

is dependent on the agen t fo r t hese res ources (French and Raven,
262- 263).
~tet· Rcseo_~

The power att empt i s only part of the power pr ocess .
response of t he reci pi ent i s eq ually

·j mportant.

has a var ·i ety of responses avai 1ab l e t o hi m.

The powe r r eci pi ent

The powe r re ci pi ent

can respon d r os "itive1y , neutr ally, or negat ivel y to t he
at temp t .

The

po~t1e r

Further-. the povter recipi ent ' s response t akes pl ace i n

four areas or f i el ds : overt

behavio r ~

p1Aivate be l iefs, ·i nt er (}cti on

\'lith t he age nt ~ and eval uati on of t he age nt (Raven and Kru gl ans k·i,

77-78).

For examp l e , th e r eci pi ent can respond pos itively t o t he
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power attempt by changing his overt behavior, while responding
negatively by changing his private beliefs in the opposite direction
sought by the agent.

!
:
,

Further negative responses could include the

avoidance of interaction with the agent and increased differentizati on beb1een recipient and agent.
Kelman has classified the available responses of the recipient
into th ree classes; namely, compliance, identification, and internalization.

Compliance is motivated by the desire for rewards

or the fear of puni shments.

Compliance t akes the form of overt

behavior or (occasionally) private beliefs.

A high degree of

surveillance is necessary to assure compliance.

Identi f ication

is motivated by the desire to maintai n a satisfying relationship
\'li th the agent.
t'elationsh·ip.

Identification requires the continuation of the
Identification

tal~es

the form of positive evaluation

of the agent and satisfying ·interacti on \'li th the agent.

Identifi-

cation can be expected to at l east l ead to compliance in overt
behavior.

Internalization i s motivated by the content of the

induced behavior.
or a continuing

Internalization requires neither s urveillance
Internali zation t akes the form of

~~el utionship.

increased positive behavior and positive pr·ivate belief ch ange
(Kel man, 1958, 51-60) .
Having established the available power resources and responses,
Ne can nov/ combine the

t\'10

in a detailed ex ami nation of the types

of power.
Reward PO':Je l'
A man of

powel~,

Benj a.min Disraeli, once observed that "real
17

politics are the possession and distribution of power."

It is

likely, given the state of English politics at the time, that
Disracli was referring to the possession and distribution of

...

re\'tards.

Of course, political patronage is the classic example

of rel·tard povter in operation.
The strength of reward po\'ter will increase with the va 1ue
to the recipient of the re\'tard controlled by the agent.
p~ter

Reward

can consist of either the administering of positive valences

or the removal of negative val ences (French and Raven, 263).
Re\'lard power , as defined here, refers to task-envi ronmenta 1 rewards.
Re\'tards derived from interpersonal relationships can be classifi ed
under the heading of referent pQI.·Jer.

A substantia 1 body of reseanh

data sho'll that the control of t ask-environmenta l rei'lards is a source
of po\·ter ( Col lins il_nd Guetzko\'ls 120-123}.

Horeover, it is not

necess ary for the agent to have direct contro 1 of re\'tards if he can
affect or mediate the re\'l ards provided by third parties (Collins and
Guetzkovt, 140 }.
The recipient's response to reward po\'ter will ordinat·ily be an
increase in positive

ovet~t

behavior.

There \'lill usually be an

accompanying increase in positive interaction with the agent, though
not necessarily an increase in identification .

The resource

diffe rences between recipi ent and agent ,,; J 1 operate to 1i mi t the
extent to wh ich the reci pient ' s evaluation of the agent will be
posit·i ve .

Rewa rd po\'Jer \'Ji 11 not necessarily l ead tO\'nlrds positive

change in private beli ef ( Raven and Krugl anski, 79 and Kel man, 1958 5
54-60}.

In other words, patronage will not guarantee hmi a person
18

will vote in the privacy of the polling booth.
Coercive PO'tfer
11

Hinds are not conquered by arms , 11 \•lamed Spinoza.

minds are not, but bodies arc.

Of course,

And coercive power exercises its

particular influence on overt behavior.
The s t rength of coercive power depends on the magnitude of
the negative val ence of the expect ed puni s hment (French and Raven,
263).

Coercive power, like reward power , will exist only to t he

degree t hat con di ti ons for punis hment are cl ear and that compli ance
can be observed by the agent (Collins and Guetz ko\'1 , 133 and Ke l man,
1958 , 55-60).

The recipi ent ' s response to coet•ci ve powe r

~li

11 ordinarily

be t ovtards pos i tive change in ove r t behaviot· and negative ch ange
in eval uati on of the agent.

Si milarl y , \'/e can expect eithe r no

change m· negati ve change in private bel iefs and in interact ion
wi th the agent (Raven and Krugl ansk i, 80 }.

Research studi es

indi cate t hat t he exerci se of coerci ve power reduced i nterpers anal
attraction and thus li mi ts the exerci se of referent pm•1er in the
fut w~e

(Co 11 i ns and Guet?.kow $ 135 }.

The punishment by t he agent

will reduce the recipient ' s i denti fication with the agen t' s person
and . thus, reduce referent pm'ler .

Coercive povtet" is disti ngui shed

from re\'Jard pm·ter by t he decreas ed i nterpersona 1 attraction,
decreased or negat i ve i nte t·acti on between agent and recipi ent, and
i ncreased surveillan ce needs ( Raven and Krugl anski , 77 and Ke l man,
1958, 51-60) .
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legitimate Power
Blackstone provides us with a fine example of the legitimate
power of position: "That the King can do no wrong is a
and fundamental principle of the English constitution."

necessa~

The

0

legitimate power of the King's position is based upon his subjects•

J

perception of the King's divine right to rule.

legitimate pm'ler

is the povter of position, be it the royal thrones the judicial
bench, or the White House.
The strength of legitimate power depends upon the degree
of

11

rightness 11 the r ecipient attributes to the agent's pov1er.

The recipient must see the agent 1 s position as a

11

ri ght11 source

of pm·ter in the particular case ( Raven and Kruglanski, 74).
pres cripti on~

Role

and expectations indicate the behavi ors i n \·lhich

an individ ua l must engage or behaviors in wh i ch he must not engage
by virtue of his position (Fren ch and Raven, 264).

In t he case of legitimate povte r, the evidence indicates that
fo rmal des i gnation as a leader, supe1·visor , boss , etcet era, \!till
be by i tself a so urce of powe r.

Such des i gnation is, however, only

one source of powe r v;hich can be s upplemented or detracted by other
pm·Jer sourc:es (Coll ins and Guetzkm1, 148- 150 ).

Leaders hi p po\':er

can in c·lude the r e'(Jards and pun·ishments opportuniti es officially or
tradi t i onarty ass oci a ted \'lith th e l eader •s_posit·ion ( Fiedler', 369370) .

In short , the l eade r' s l egiti mate pm·1er may be supplemented

by reward or punishment pov1e r avai l ab l e to him due to the l egi t i mat e

roi e he fi ll s (Jacobs on, 24-25 ).
The recipient ' s res ponse to l egi t i mate povle t· will ordina rily
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involve positive change in both overt behavior and private beliefs.
The recipient \'li 11 decrease i denti fi cation \·lith the agent, s i nee
the possession of 1egi timate power increases dissimi 1arities.

To

the extent that the recipient \'tishes to avoid the legitimate request
to do something he \'IOuld prefer not to do, interaction . \·tith the .
agent may decrease (Raven and Kruglanski, 75 and 80).

Legitimate

power does not require surveillance since the recipient's motivation
is his own internalized values.

Legitimate povter does require the

continuation of the recipient·agent relationship (Kelman, 1958, 54·

60).
Referent Po\'ter
People are generally bette r persuaded by the
l~easons 1•1hi ch they have themse'lves discovered
than by those which have come into the min ds
of othe rs .
-Pascal
Actually, petsuasion is not really so demanding. · But
persuasive success is more li kely v1hen l't'e can identify

out~selves

and our thoughts with the characte r and attitudes of the other.
He can be persuaded by the thoughts

\It hi

ch come into the minds of

others as long as their entry into our minds is not alien_
Referent power is

~i mply

fication and attr·action.

the process of interpe rsonal identi -

The strength of t•eferent powe r is

dependent upon the degree of inte t~pe l~sona 1 ·attraction betv1een
recipien t and agent (Fren ch and Raven, 266).

Research data sh ov1

that increas ed intet'personal attraction of other group members

for a single member ·increases the pOI'Ier of that individual (Colli ns
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and Guetzkow, 128 and Jacobson, 28 and 121}.
The recipient response to referent pm'ler will ordinarily
involve positive change in overt behavior, private belief,
interaction with the agent, and identification with the agent.
Referent power, successfully used, increases i denti fi cation by
further increasing the recipient's perception of similarity.
Thus, referent pm'ier, based on identification, increases its
cl'lln basis when successfully used.

t~oreover,

the perception of

similarity \'lill lead to increased pos itive interaction between
recipi ent and agent {Raven and Kruglanski, 81).
Expert

P01~

Hhen the experts are agreed the opposite
opinion cannot be hel d to be cert ain ; when t he
experts are not agreed , then no opinion can be
held to be certain.
-Bert rand Russell
Russe 11

pe rh a~s

overs t at es t he po\lter of experts because he

speaks of matte rs of truth and not matte rs of pm<te r.

The exper t' s

po\'/er in creases \•ti th t he ext ent of his knowl edge, s kill s or
abili t i es and with the dependence of the reci pient on these
1Aes ources {F1·ench and Raven, 267 ).

A reputation of competence ,

rega1·dl ess of whether t he group has obse\' ved the compe t ence, \'Ji 11
serve as a sour ce of power {Collins and Gue t zkow, 145- 147).
Control over in fonnat i on i s al so a s ource of pm·1er .

The possessi on

of te 1evant i nforma ti on , even by a s1:1a 11 minority of the group is
a maj or s our ce of pm•Je r (Shm'l and Penrod s 19 and Kass at' j ian and
Kassarj ian, 49 1).

22

The recipient's response to expert power will ordinarily
involve positive change in overt behavior and in private beliefs.
As in the case of legitimate power, the use of expert power

emphasizes the differences between recipient and agent, resulting
in negative i denti fi cation.

Expert povrer may furth er 1ead to

avoidance of interaction with the agent if the reci pi ent would
prefer not to be influenced (Raven and Kruglanski, 80 ).
Succes sful use of expert pm'ler,

hov~e v e r,

requires neithe r s ur ..

veill ance nor an ongoing rel ationship (Ke lman , 1958, 54-60).
The link betvreen the pm'le r agent and the p0\'1er reci pi ent
in the process cf po\'/er exe rcise is comn unication.

Conmuni cat i on

is the vehicle or mechanism used to actuali ze or ooerati onali ze
pm<~e r

(Schachter , 166 and Jacobson, 42 and 80 ).

Hhether we

com,11un i cate ou r poHer to the othe r is deter111i ned by our percepti on of the opportunity.
confi nnc.!d by the group.

This percepti on is fo rmed i n and
An unders t andi ng of t he determinants of

the communi cation of power i s sought in the third proposition .

Th e percept i on of the worl d is an act i ve process comp ri sed
of fi l tering , arrangi ng, and di stortin g i ncomi ng experience i n
order to mai ntain consistency 1·1 ith past expe r'i ence nnd bel i efs .
In l arge part, \'-le create t he

1'/0 l~l d

1>1e percei ve ( Frank, 97-11 3).

The perceptual cons t ruction of real ity depends on ti'IO
p roce~s e<> :

a fi lter i nu process that determines
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\'I hat

i s selected

as stimuli and an interpretative process that determines vthat
meaning the stimuli has for us {de Riveria, 39).
In the Book of Common Prayer, vte find a prayer to God
asking for help for those vtho cannot see the lord--"eyes have
they, and see not. 11

As some do not see the lord, some frequently

avoid more empirical stimuli everyday.

He control the stimuli

vthi ch confront us by avoidance of situations or sources \'lhi ch might
provide unwelcome stimuli.

In short, we actively build an environ-

ment of friends, books, ide as, et cetera, \'I hi ch pro vi de us vii th
\'telcome stimuli and protects us from unvtelcome ones (de Riveria,

40-41). We can further control the stimuli which con f ront us by
creating \'telcomed stimuli.

The self-fulfilling prophecy involves

actions base d on our perception which actually produce stimuli
confinning the odginal perception.

The self-fulfilling prophecy

is made possib le by t he inte ractive nature of human behavior (Frank,
145 and de Riveria, 40 ).

The second process of per·cepti on i s the i nte rpretat·i ve stage.
t·1onse11 pl eads to the non .. beli evers to 11 0nly believe, and thou
shalt see 11 Christ.

Often we inte rpret stimuli on the bas is of an

almost religio us faith .

When an event does occur and we do perceive

it, the stimuli may sti ll be l egiti mately in te rpreted in several
different vwys.

~le

tend t o £ri ve t he meaning to a sti muli which

requi res th e l enst psychological change in our be"liefs ( de Riveri a ,
22).

In short, the human perceptual process enables us to deny

or di s tort data in order to conf·inn our images cm d beli efs ( Deutsch

a.nd 11erritt, 182- 183 ).
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For a non-religious example, we can turn to the field of
international relations.

Individuals form images of nations

considered to be enemies.
tions regarding

11

Once the image is formed and expacta-

their 11 actions are shaped, information is

selected and interpreted to confirm the image (Frank, 116-117
and Scott, 80).

A specific example involves the Japanese attack

on Pearl Harbor.

According to one theory, intelligence informa-

tion indicating the f orecoming attacks \·tas not seen as relevant.
The infot111ation conflicting vtith accepted beliefs was interpreted
in different \'lays to conf orm with our image of the Japanese as
too weak and timid for attack .

This exampl e cl early demons trates

the degr·ee to which 11 \'/e construct the reality in \·thi ch \'te operate"
(de Ri ve ri a , 20-21 an d Woh lstetter, 691-767) .
Natura 'l1y , v1c ftequently adap t our beli efs to new dat a.

Our

resi stances ar-e s o strong, however , th at they can be ove rcome only
i f nonH of the cons istent inter pretati ons can be eas "ily accounte d
for.

Fo r example, 1·,re might find that act i ons based on one

pretat i on do not

V101·k .

In the face of fa ilure ,

\'l e

inte l~

may be f otced to

alte r our inte r pretat i on (de Ri ve ri a, 35-36) .
Rol e of Stress
The no rmal sel ectivi ty of our perceptual process i s aggr avated
dur ing stressful or cri sis situat i ons.

Durin g t i mes of stress

He

arc l ess open t o sti tnuli, consi der fevte r intel·pret ati ons , and are
more rig i d and repet i t ive in our interpretations ( Prui t t, 395-396
and Robinson and Snyder, 457) .

The f ur t he r di st ortion of the

perceptuc:l process may be t i ed to the need fo r structu re and the fear
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of ambiguity in the crisis situation (de Riveria, 150).

Research

indicates that groups in stressful situations make early attempts
to recognize structure i n ambiguous situations. r1oreover, these
groups rigidly adhere to initial interpretations despite increasingly
conflicting stimuli {Korten, 355).
So far, it may sound as though the individual perceives in a
vacuum.

Actually, individual knov1ledge is either the result of

personal experience, of observation of another 's experience, or of
hearing a report about another's experience {Collins and Guetzkovt,
38).

In any case, individuals tend to seek stability in their

beliefs and perceptions through associ ation in groups {de Riveri a ,
27).

r-es t i nger hilS postul ated t hat 1·1e are motivated by a dt•i ve to
evaluat e our opi ni ons which, in t he absence of objective or physical
data, can only be s atisfied through compari son with ot hers (Radloff ,
110 and Festi nger , 1954 , 117- 119).

The group , then, serves as th e

validator of our soci al pe r ceptions. Groups al so fonn our perceptions by cont rolling t he stinuli v:e receive fr om them and encouragi ng
li mH ed interpretat i ons of sti muli.

He fin d that the confi nnation

of perceptual \'l orlds among group mnmbers i s sel f- rein forcing since
each member i s checking his vi ews against t hose of others \·tho sh are
simil ar views

(F rank ~

99- 100).

In short, \•/e precei ve the \1/ay events 1·el at e to the povter

\'te

possess . Avail able data indicates t hat in the case of Pearl Harbor,
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no major decision-maker perceived of the possibility of attack.
Those lesser officials filtered the stimuli available to the major
decision-makers, thus precluding the decision-makers from realizing
an opportunity to exercise power.

The lesser officials interpreted

the stimuli they received in a manner conforming to officials'
expectations.

In so interpreting the information, the lesser

offici a1s did not rea 1i ze an opportunity to exercise expert pm·ter
by making the information and their interpretations known to major
decision-makers.

The example of Peat·l Harbor is perhaps typical

of governmental operation.

Leaders ordinarily receive both

infor~

mation and interpretations through channels and organizations.
The opportunity to exercise power on the basis of certain informa tion
or on behalf of certain options is not realized due to the nature
of out• perceptua·l process (see Halperin , 197 '1 , 88-89 and Verba , 1961a,
112).

!he AeEropri ateness of the Exercise of Pov,rer is
Detenm ned bflJie P_erceetua
o , tl]eGr'Ou~
Appropriateness is the quality of being allov1able or fitting
to the occasion .

Power \'lhich is not deemed appropriate is not

likely to be effective.

The perceptual images of the group refer·s

to the almost v·isual set of expectations the group holds regarding
ro lcs and interacti ve behavior.

These

9ro~:~p

expectations are, in

turn, effected by the task/interpersonal orientation of the group.
Expectations _9.bout interactive behavi_Q!:. are limi tations on
acceptable types of behavior.

A member may not be rude or, in some

groups , qui et \'li t hout viol ati ng the group's image of ho\'J inter action
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will occut' (de Ri veri a, 70).

Be me theorizes that groups soon

fonn a collective image of ho\'1 the group members should interact.
These patterns of acceptable interaction form the group etiquette
and character (Berne, 92 and 110),

The group etiquette serves to

limit members in the exercise of pm1er.

For example, a group

whose etiquette called for cooperative interaction among members
would deem the obvious use of coercive power inappropriate.

The

same group may heavily rely upon and even sanction the appropriateness of referent pov1er.
Role expectati.ons and

i ma~es

form an organizational structure

\'lhich supports the group etiquette by pres cribing appropriate
behavior for each person.

The individual's role indicates the v1ay

in which he is supposed to act consistent with group expectations
(Berne , 38).

The individual's rol e operates to direct the

i ndi vi dua 1 tah'ards certain behaviors as appropri ate and a•day from
beh avi ors inappropriate to the group's organization al

stru ct u~e

(Raven and French, 400).
The group's perception of member roles limits membe rs to
the exercis e of pov1er only \'/hen it is consi s tent v1ith the rol e.
For exampl e, the role definition of an expert mi ght make the
exe1·ch:e of expert pm'le r natura1 and appropr·i ate.
might be li mited by hi s rol e from
well.

Of

course~

a po\'l er· attempt.

exet~cising

The same expert

ref erent powe r as

roles al so encourage a pm·w r reci pi ent to accept
The response to a l egiti mate power attempt is

especially influenced by the individual's rol e.

The fai lure to

exercis e p01·1er in conformity \'l ith r ol e expectations v1ill likely
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result in effectual pO\•/er at best, and a reduction of future
pm"ler at \-Jorst.
The task/interpersonal orientation of the group further aids
the determination of appropriateness of power exercise.

Bales

has postulated that every group faces opposing strains bet\•/een
task- environmental and interperson al (social -emotional) needs.
The accomplishment of task needs requires specialization and
differentialization of pov1e r, while the satisfaction of interpersonal needs requires simi'larity and power equality (Bales,
127-131).

rn other \·lords, the task need requires specialization

among group members which increases the differences between
them.

The increased differences that result from speci a1i zati on

reduce the satisfaction of interpe rsonal needs .

Task needs

further require po'11er· differences with some members possessing
more po\·,te r th an others .

Tflese pov/el" diffel"ences reduce the

sati sfaction of in terpersonal needs which requi re pOI'Ier consistency.
Ev·idence for Bale's theory (Collin s and Guetzk0\·1 , 214- 221 and
Jacobson , 95- 98) shov1s that task emphas i s by the group may produce
greater productivity, but reduced i nte rpers ana 1 satisfaction.

An

interpersonal emphasis \'til'! le ad to greater satisfact i on, but may
do so at t he expense of task success.

An interpersonal orientation

is characteri zed by cooperative, fl"iendly, non-status oriented
behavi or.

A task orientation i s charact eri zed by compet iti ve ,

agg 1·ess ive , status oriented behavior.
The t as k/interpetsonal orientation of the g1·oup \'Jill operate
to rul e cert.ai n pm·t er attempts i naprro pl"i ate.
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llani s offers evi dence

that interpersonal orientation in groups reduces critical thinking
(Janis, 1972, 198-199). He might expect fe\'tet· po\'ter attempts in a
group with the characteristics of interpersonal orientation.

\·le

might also expect the use of referent po\'ter to be the most appropriate
in interpersonally oriented groups.

He do kno\'t that interpersonal

orientation results in a high degree of conformity due to the greater
cohesiveness of such groups (Jacobson, 96-97) .
A number of factors operate to determine a group 's orientation
at a given decision-making point.

Bales clearly sees task and

interpersonal strains operating in constant tension.

The failure

to achieve balance between task and interpersonal orientations
over a period of time will reduce cohesiveness by neglect of either
task or interpersonal goals.

In short, the factor of ti me \'till

scn·ve in a cohes ive group as u force fot· change in orientations
tovHH'ds ba l unce.
FuY'thel' change in orientations may occur in res ponse to
extern al events.

For example , negative evaluat·ion f1·om exte rnal

sounes of the group \'lil1 ·lead to an interperson al orientat ion
(Jacobson, 144).

Further » there is some evidence to suggest t hat

groups are more inclined tOI'Iards a t ask emphas·is in ti mes of crisis

(Kot·t cn , 356).

Thes e exte r·nal press ures may aid in a determination

of a partict1lar group's emphasis ·during a particula.Y' decision al
situation .
The In dividual Percept·ion of Des·irab ili ty of Po\·Jer Exeni se
his J1erce6l 1on anCT'7\ssessment of tl~ rtun i ty_

rs--D(~telnmi necf !~X

Indivi dual evaluati on of t he des i r ab i ·1ity of t he oppor tunity
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includes the follm'ling considerations:

the importance of the issue;

the net advantage to be gained; and the possible effectiveness of
the power attempt.
The agent will find the exercise of povter more desirable as the
importance of the issue increases (Festinger, 1968, 185).

The

recipient will find the positive response to a pQ\Iter attempt less
desirab le as the importance of the issue increases.

The importance

of the situation is a significant determinant of the choice to
exercise pm'ler (Lippitt, et al., 243-244).
Nei the\" the power agent nor the pOI'Ier recipient wi 11 engage
in a successful power attempt without perceiving an advantage to
their actions.

l·le may, for ex amp 1e, act in accordance \·Ji th our

role expectations in order to continue to conform to group expectations and perhaps recP.ive group rewards (Car-tw ri ght and Zander,
219).

Or 'l'le may act in a manner designed to preserve our power

for future opportuniti es (Hil sman, 1959 , 365).
The desirability of initiating pm'ler attempts is, in part ,
related to individual percepti on of the probability of success.
We are more likely to initiate a pmter attempt if we perceive that
v1e \'/ill be successful (Festinger, 1968, 186 ) .

p01·1er is highly correlated \'Jith perception of

Self-perception of
pm<~er

in attempted influence (Lippitt, ·et al. , 240-243).
\'Je

by others and
Accordingly,

might expect the recipi ent's perception of his po\'Jer and the

agent's pov1er to determi nc the degree of resistance to a power
attempt.

Stud·ies do show that the more confident a deviate, the

greatCl' Hi 11 be his resistan ce to po\'Jer attempts (Hochhaum, 683-687 ).
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Certainly, we can expect the recipient to evaluate the strength
and probability of success of any given pm•ter attempt.
In surrrnary, cohesive groups develop pressures to\ltards conformity
on a given issue .

The direction of the confonnity pressures will be

determined by the effective utilization of pm'ler Hithin the group.
The utilization of poHer is limited or allowed by the perceptions and
expectations of the group.
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CHAPTER III

THE BAY OF PIGS
The ill-fated invasion of Cuba in April, 1961
was one of those rare politico-military events-a perfect failure.
-Theodore Draper
Victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an
orphan.
..John F. Kennedy
Perfect failures seem to be dest·jned to be orphaned.

Certainly

in the case of the Gay of Pigs no one vJas willing to claim parenthood.

John Kennedy stepped forward to accept full responsibility

much like the young man \'lho marries h·is pregnant girlfriend while

procl aim·ing his virtue and virginity to his parents.
Pigs \·Jas mote bastard than orphan.

The Bay of

And l·i ke many bastards, the

"father 11 is diff·i cult to de te rm·ine.

Shortly uftCl" his

el e ction~

Pres ident-elect Kennedy was

bri efed on the preparations for· the Bny of Pigs operation init) ated
under the previous administration.

appt·ova.1 for continuing

pl'e pal~ation

At the time, he gave hi s
v1ithout a.ctual1y r.ommitting

himself to eventual c:pproval of thH invasion attemp t (Schlesinger,
233).

CIA Dir ector All en Dulles nnd hi s assistant Richard Bissell
faced a "di ff'ic u1t dH11l enge 11 in
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persu C.~ ding

a nei'Js-

mo~·e

"liberal"

Pt~esident

to support the invasion plan.

Imnediately, these two

men, certain that they knew best for the nation, began selling
the ne\'1 President the operation by telling him whatever they
thought would persuade (Gelb and Halperin, 28-30).

T\'IO

days

after the inallguration, Dulles and General Lemnitzer, Chainnan
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, br·iefed the leading members of the
nevt administration.

Followi ng the briefing, Kennedy ordered the

Joint Chiefs to make a complete study of the plan•s military
feasibility and allm·1ed the CIA to proceed with the preparations
it was making (Schl esinger, 238}.
Theodo1'e Sorensen reports that after the invasion failure
the

p,~esi dent

told tri m of his own deep skepticism from the

beginning (Sorensen , 1965, 295).

Schlesinger also r eports an

c<n·lier co:we rsation Nith Kenn edy which indicated the President's
douhts ab out thc-! invas·i on's ability t o "touch off a mas s insurrection agai nst the regime".

'fhe Hhite House , the Jo·in t Chiefs

of Staf f$ end supposedly the C!l\ all conside red the t r i g9e ring of

an uprising within Cuba to be crucial to the invasion's

success

(S chles inger, 2116-247 }.

Das pi tc ea1· ly skepticism, J ohn Kennedy, a 11 the seni ot'
advisors \'li t hin t hP. iidministration. t he Joint Chi efs of Staff,
and!' of course, t he

CIJl.~-a 1'1

supported the p1an.

Th rough out the

pe r iod dur ing v' ich t he p1an was under· serious consideration

there

Has

43).

The meetings, Schle!>i nger reportsp took 11 place i n a curious

iltmosphe t'e

vi ttua11y

110

oppos·it'i on \·Jith'irt the ttdm'irdstt' uti on (Halton,

of assumed consens us ."
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The key dcci s i on- nt:\ke1·s met four

times after 1·1arch 15 to consider the plan.

The Joint Chiefs

approved of the operation's military feasibility.

Robert

MacNamara, seemingly preoccupied in his ne1-1 position, accepted
the verdict of the Chiefs regarding the plan's military feasi:1

bility and the verdict of the CIA reg arding the likelihood of

i

an uprising.

Dean Rusk listened "inscrutab ly .. , making only a

few "gent1e 11 noises about possi hle excesses {Schlesinger, 250).
Ct··iticism d·id carne ft·om lesse1· offic-ial s \'lithin t he adminSchl esi nger provided a

·istration.

\'H~i tt e n

criti ci sm fot· Kenn edy,

but did not speak out duri ng the 1·1at·ch or April

me eting s~

Under~

secretary of State Chestel' Bo·;(ies" learning of the pl an wh·ile
fill i ng in for r.usk who v1as at

ct

SEATO meeting, was

hon~if·ied

at

the grotlp1 s co;rapi a cent acceptance of Hhat he saw as a badly
flnwed

pl ~.n .

Pres i dent

Hi s oppositi on 1 us v;e shnl"l

( Sch l e~; in ge r ~

2SO )e

se e~

Fl-om out si de th e

never r eached the
c1 C~ministl~a tionv

a t h·i r d voice of di s sent crws raised by S<·!nator Hilli am Fu1br-i qht: .
At th e f in al meeting of the de ci sion-maki ng gr oup on April 4i
Fulbl'ight
p lan ~

g u v~

u strong o:1ci irq)assi oned speech ogai nst t he invas i on

Foll ett·li r: g tl1is s t t'mtg speech by an out5 i de r, t'lacNiJJ,w t·a an d

the othm- seni or advisors

tha

in vrts i on~

p rc..:ee(~E: d

Y.. en1wdy di ci not call on sc:r.les inge ;· t o voi ce his

cr·i ti cis:tlS. s and Schles inge l' di d not
Th us~

t o indi cat e thcit· support fo r

th;! de1ibeti':tions ended

\'/it!1

choo~ e

to vol unteer

t!H~m .

on 1y onE: vo·i ce of di ssent

hcnd ng eve r been r a·i sed wi t irin the group of de ci s i o;1- :nakers

T hf~ SHcc.::ssfu·l

ope;"a.t ion of st ron9
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r~·es s u res fo t~

conformity i s

evident.

Schlesinger limited his public opposition partly due

to a feeling of futility (Schlesinger, 255}.

John Kennedy may

have contributed to such feelings by saying several

d~s

before

the Apri 1 4 meeting that 11 \'/e seem now des tined to go ahead on a
quasi-minimum basis 11 (Schlesinger, 256}.

A few days l ater at

the home of Robert Kennedy, Sch 1es i nger was dravm aside by the
Attorney General and asked about his opposition to the plan.
Robert Kennedy responded to Schlesinger's criticisms by saying,
"you may be right or you may be \'/rang, but the President has
made his mind up.

Don't push it any further.

Novt is the time

for everyone to help him all they can 11 (Janis, 1972, 41-42).
Robert Kennedy's pressuring on hehalf of the President took pl ace
several days before the April 4 meeting at which Schlesinger
remained so sil ent.
The case of Chester Bov.tles is an equally clear exan1ple of
the operation of conformity press m·es .

Dowles prepa1ned a memo

listi ng the reasons for his opposition to the invasion.

Upon

Rusk's r etm·n, BO\'>'les asked his supet-ior to fon•l ard the memo to
the Pr·es ident or to let Bov1lcs himse1f present it to the group.
Rusk r·efused to do so . saying that the ·invasion 1<1ould be pared

do1-m to a quiet little infiltr'at i on an_y\'lay.

Hhen Bm·l les' opposition

became public knm:l edge fo 11 o;·ring the invasion ' s failut·e 5 he paid
dearl y

1·Ji th

hi s job and his 1·eputc:ti on among the Kennedys (Hil sman,

1967, 36-37 and J an is, 1972, 42 ).
Thus, th e only direct, open, and comp1ete dis a9reement \<lith

the invasion came from Serwtor Fulbl"ight on the final day of th e
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group's deliberations.

Obviously, the last minute opposition

by a lone outsider did little to oub'leigh the "united

~oice

of

institutional authority" and the support of all the senior
advisors {Schlesinger, 258- 259 and Janis, 1972, 44).
Of course John Kennedy approved the invasion.

On Apri 1 17

it began. and it soon became obvious that it was destined to be
a "perfe ct failure".

The question nm'i becomes one of explanation.

How did the group come to such uniform agreement on such an
amazing fiasco? As \'las earlier theorized, confol,nity pressures
develop around poli cy options supported by the greatest sources
of effectively exercised power within the group.
The Effective Exetci se of Po\'-ter
-----..
Ho\'1 caul d I ha.ve been so fm~ off base? Hmt
could I hctve been so stupid, to l et then, go
ahead?
- John Kennedy
Kennedy's "stupidity" and the "stupidity" of hi s major
advisors \'l as in theil· responses to the power attempts by Dulles
and Bisse11.

These expert bureaucrats {see pol'te r agents )

effectively limited the pm'ler of the President and his senior
advisors by a number CJf

time~honored

techniques {Gelb and Halpel'·in,

28-36 ).

Horton Hal perin writes that bureaucraci cs exercise their
pOI'Ier through fout· areas of po 1icy-making : information, presentation of options, freedom to choose options , and imp"l ementation .
The contto1 of information is a major source of pO\•ter
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f01~

agencies

to protect their interests by influencing policy.

The selection

of information is different from what the President would like
to have and from what he thinks he is getting.
The presentation of options limits the framework in which
the President may choose.

He chooses between policy option X

and Y, but the agency presenting the options chooses the content
of X and Y and \'lhy there is no Z.
Shou 1d options contrary to the interests of an agency become
availabl e, the agency will act
to choose that option .

lo

;M"

limit the President's freedom

The President's options can be li mited

through threatened l eaks to the press or claims of i nfeasi bil i ty
based on special knowledge.
Final ly, losing all else, the agency can i mp l ement an umoJanted
Presidenti al decis·ion in a manner inconsistent \'lith its intent.

-is

an easy matter· to obey the l etter

\'I hi

than the spirit of a
---- - --- Easier· still is the delaying tactic at
-

Prf~s·i dent ia1

directive.

rathel~

It

-

ch bureaucrats become adept (Hal ped n. 1971 , 88·89 ) .

The exercise of power by Dulles and Bissell on behalf of the
CI A i s a cl ass ic example of the techniques outl·ined by Halperin.

The underlying force behind the s uccess of these techniques is
si mple power.

With these t actical methods in mind, I nmt turn to

a consideration of the exercise of pm-1er by those invol ved in th e
Bay of Pi gs deci sion.

There i s littl e di1·ect evidence of the exercise of reward pa.'ler·
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by the participants in the Bay of Pigs decision.

In the absence

of direct evidence and examples, I can only point to the existence
of the potential and the opportunity for the use of reward power.
Clearly, the Kennedy brothers and Dean Rusk possessed potentia 1

1

I

reward power over their respective subordinates, Schlesinger and

J

Bowles.

I think it reasonable to suspect that during the early

months of the administration, subordinates v1ould be especially
eager to gain the favor and rewards of their superiors.
to the group norm 1·1as directly

l~eq ue s ted

Schlesinger and by Dean Rus k of Bowles.

Compliance

by Robe rt Kennedy of
One can ass t.mle that

Schlesinger and Bowl es foresa\'1 a reward to be gained th rough
compliance.
Coercive Pa,.,r er
~lh eneve1'"

a Presi dent rej ects the advice of a

rnajot~

advi so1·

\'l'ho has staked hi s reputation and prestige on his advice !> a
dangerous enemy may res ult (de Rived a, 235 and Sorensen 9 1963 ,
00).

Dull es and Bi ssell exerci sed the tht"eat of coerci ve pm'le r

in order to li mi t the Pres ident' s ability t o choose t he opti on of
cancell ati on .

Having heavily committ ed t hei r pres ti ge to t he

pl an, its cancell ati on \•Joul d have made 11 dangerous enemi es 11 of them
both {Gel b and Hal peri n, 30).
i'li t hout having to t hreaten the

11

l eakin g11 of ·inf onnati on by

t hernse lves , Dull es and Bis sell 1·1ere nb 1e to argue t hat t he
cancell ati on of t he pl an l'lou1d become public knCJw l edgc through

the disbanding of t he refugee traini ng program.
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Dull es frequent ly

stressed the problem of disposing the trained refugees.

At the

Harch 11 meeting he pressed, "Don•t forget that we have a disposal
problem.

If

\'Je

have to take these men out of Guatemala, v1e will

have to transfer them to the United States, and we can•t have them
wandering around the country te 11 ing everyone \·that they have been
doing•: (Schlesinger, 242).

The reason 11 \-Je can•t have them telling

••• vthat they have been doing" is that it would be politically
embarrassing to administration 'ilho campaigned on the do-nothing
policy of the Eisenhm-Jer administration tov1ards Cuba (Walton, 3541).

As So1·ensen puts it, the P1·esident would be accused of

calling off a plan to overthrow Castro.

After all, all that was

being asked v1as for the United States to "allm·/ 11 the refugees to
11

1·eturn home 11 (Sorensen, 1965, 306).

In short, had the President

called off the invasion, he would have suffered considerable
po"litical embarrassrn7.nt to say the least (Janis , 1972t 31).
Referent Po\-Jer
Dulles and Bissell backed up the implicit threat of political
embarra5sment shou1d the President cancel the plan \-Jith a sizable
dose of 1·eferent r.ov1e r as \vell.

The third party nature of the

leak by ft·ustl·ated refugees, 1·ather than by the

t\-10

adm·ini strators

themselvesp en abled Dulles and Bissell to take advantage of the
Presi dent ' s political predi cament without seeming to actually
threv.ten hi m \·lith pol itical harm.

As a result, the substantial

good will directed tm·wrds Dulles and Bissell could continue to

operate as an effective source of referent power.
Dulles and [3issell

\'.'e i--e

admired for thei r intelligence and
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ability.

Bissell especially seemed capable in inspiring great a\'te

in at least some members of the policy group (Schlesinger, 241).
Kennedy \'las s uffi ci ent ly impressed with Bi sse11--he probably
intended to appoint him to be Dulles' successor as Director of the
CIA (Hilsman, 1967, 30).

In short, they were seen as "highly

prized members" of the team (Janis, 1972, 47).
Irving Janis' interpretation of the invasion decision process
places heavy stress on the interpersonal attraction bet\'1een the
new admini s tration and Dulles and Bissell (Janis, 1972, 46-47).
Much of what Janis sees as interpe rson al attraction or identification seems to be to be an admiration and respect for the abilities
of those

p e t~sons.

The difference is important, since referent

povter is based upon i dentification vJith a pers on. · Respect for the
skills and abiliti es of a pers on is expert power.

The ease with

\·lhich John Kennedy d!llnped both Dull es and Bi ssell foll ovling the
pl an' s f ail ure and the degree t o \'lhich he bl amed "experts .. for
deceiving hi m (see Sorensen p 1965 . 302M303) s ugges t that the
l~e fe t-en t

beli eves .

pm'ier of Du'll es and Bi ssel 1 was more 1i mi ted t han Janis
M01·e i mpm·tant ly » the great expe \"t pO\'Ier exerci sed by

Dull es and Bissell conf li cts with t he exerci se of great ref erent
power, s in ce expert power creates a dis t ance between peopl e th at
limi ts ident ificati on (Bales, 129-130 ).
Refe t-ent pm·Jel" may have been exercis ed to s ome degree by

Dull es and Bi ssell .

Opponent Schl esi nge r probably used an even

sma ll er· amount of referent pm·Jer on John Kenn edy.

Kennedy saw

Schlesinger as the White House historian and as hi s l i nk t o the
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Stevenson wing of the party, not as a close ft•iend or trusted
advisor (Anderson, 256-257 and 275).

As we shall see later,

being 1inked to Stevenson would almost automati ca11y limit the
amount of i nterpersona 1 attraction bet\'leen Kennedy and Schlesinger
(see Halberstram, 21-24).

In fact, Schlesinger's memoirs and

history of Kennedy's administration is less worshipful and selfserving than that of othe1" Kennedy insiders.
Legitimate Power
The exercise of legitimate po\'Jer by the CIA, John and Robert
Kennedy, and Dean Rusk a 11 served to further the adoption of the
invasion plan by a confonning group.

The CIA attempted to utilize

legitimate power in order to assure that they alone would be the
exclusive providers of information.

Dulles and Bissell somehow

prevailed upon the President to keep i nte 11 i gence experts in the
Defense and State Departments in the dark (Hil sman, 1967s 30).
Thus, the CIA utilized l egitimate power to strengthen its expert

pm'ler by assuring itself of exclusive

contt~ol

of infonnation.

Dulles and Bissell further exercised legitimate power to
contr·ol the pr·es entation of opt ions.
options \'lere

stated~

Throughout the meetings the

defi ned , and dr.fended by Dulles and Bissell

as if only they had t he 11 right 11 to do so (Janis, 1972, 43).
As mentioned eal"li er, John Kennedy's position as President
and Robert Kennedy ' s position as hi s b\·other \~Jere sources of power.

llohn Kennedy's pov,rer remained l at·gely as potential, but Robe rt's

baggering of Sd1l es inger i s clearly an exerci se of power based on
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his special relationship to the President.
Finally, good old quiet, careful Dean Rusk used his position
as Secretary of State to keep subordinate Chester BCMles from
voicing his opposition and to keep intelligence director Roger
Hilsman from investigating his doubts (Hilsman, 1967, 31).

BO\'Iles

and Hilsman both responded to the legitimate power of Rusk.
~er! Po!!~!:

In the aftennath of the invasion's failure. the Kennedy
insiders tended to blame the "experts" for the ·invasion's adoption.
In a sense, \1/hile publicly accepting blame himsel f, John KEmnedy
sm<~

the ·CIA as the rea 1 fathe r of defeat.

used massive amo unts of expert powel'o

It is true that the CIA

It is al so true that the

members of the admini stration accepted those

t-esponded to that

infl t~ nces

an d

pm<~er.

Fit·st , Dulles a.nd Bissell excl"cised control over
a form of expert power,.

For

example~

infonn at·ion -~

the likelihood of an updsing

bei ng t riggey·od by the invasion force ' s l anding 1<1as s olely 'l ef t

up to the expert judgement of Dulles and Bissell.
cruci a1 natut'G of this

judgeme nt~

Despite the

Dulles did not even cons u·t t the

Deput y Director of the CIA for Intell ·ig(mce.

In short, the

Pres ident's only source of info rmation for the f easi bility of the
invas ion was the CIA (Hil sman,

1967 ~

31 and Walton, 46).

The Jo·int Chiefs of Staff conditioned the·i r approval of the

plan on the likelihood of an uprising inside the island.

In

approving the plan, the Chiefs made it clear that the ultimate
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success of the plan required a s izable uprising.

They reli ed

upon the untested judgment of Dulles and Bissell t hat such an
uprising would occur {Schlesinger, 238- 239 and Tully, 243).
Secondly , Dulles and Bi sse 11 exercised expe1·t powe1· to
present and limit the options before t he Presi dent .

As noted

earli er, th e CI A offici al s were the only sources for options
and t he de fenders of t he invasion.

Fo r

example ~

Kennedy \<Jas

con cerned that if the operation f ail ed , he woul d l ook ve ry bad.
Thi s percepti on on Kennedy 's part

\'IO Uld

ser ve t o offset t he

coer ci ve effec t of calli ng the in vasion off .
defin ed fail ure as an in feas ibl e option.

Dull es and Bisse ll

No matte;" \•that happens ,

t hey ass ure d the group, the force c:o.n make its \'lay t o t he neat·by
mount ai ns und take up guerrill a operations .

d1. s posf~' o.L: t. hem.?

\~hat

better way to

In act ua 11 ty , l ess than a th i rd of the fotce

had received guP.rri 11 a tra·i ni ng; t he nearby mountains we t-e
b1ocked by an impenetr·able swamp; t1nd t he i nvasion l eade1-s had
been to ld to stay on the beaches o.nd \·lai t fo r United StatC>s

support {Ge1b and Ha lpctin,
618; and

Soren sen~

30~

Ihe

1965, 302··303 ) .

-~~por~£!_, t·luy

11 , 1961; Cook,

1\t no time did any ll'!f!rnbel' of

the ad!11i ni stl'·ati on question t lwse judgments by Dulles and B·i ssc11 .
Du"l "l es and Bi ssell wc1·e a.sked questions. and they ans\'Je1·ed them.
Ho one even bothered to l ook at a

mt~ p

s howi ng the S\'lamp.

The CIA was also able to r ule out the del ay option, wh i ch is

a favorite of Presidents not eager for a pl an they cannot find a
gcod reason to cancel .

Ris i ng to the occas i on, Dull es and Bissell

\'l v.ged a cl assic "now ot· never" argume:1t .
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Arguing that the

Guatemalian government \'las impatient \'lith the training of the
refugees on its soi 1, that refugee morale was at its peak and
would soon decline, that the rainy season \voul d soon turn the
landing area to mud, and that Castro would soon receive jets
from the Soviets, the CIA said it \·tould require the use of the

J

t~ar·ines

United State

and Ail· Force to overthro•11 Castro after

June 1 {Sch1 esinger, 239-240; Sorensen, 1965 ,
and Halperin, 31}.

295~296;

and Gelb

(In short, the Guatemalian government, the

refugees, God, and the Soviet government \·Jere all enlisted in a
push for an i!mlediate decision.)

The CIA was not the only expert power-wielding force operating
during the del iberations.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did appt·ove

of the plan' s militat"Y feasibility.

Following a time-honored

tradition (P.nison, 125), no one in the administration questioned
the expert judgment of the Joint Chiefs.

The mil.jor flm·1s of the

pl an .. -the f ·irst night-t·ime am;:>h i bious landing ever and a
forgotten or ignored cora l reef--rnude it 5Usceptible to questioning

even by rel ative amateurs
But i t

\·HiS

{John ~on? i04) .

not que:stioned.

The e>:pe rt authority of the CIA

and the Joint Chiefs was l arge ly accepted
Til'~

fl ai\'S

\'Jel"\!

with little opposition.

there to see. hut no one in authority 1ooked.

The

necessary informution suggesting i:hc up rising Hould fail to
matetitdize existed in an d out of the
it (llil sman, l97lp 130).
not t•ai sed

this

(So n~n ~en,

n <~glcct

~JOV~rnments

but no one saw

Doubts about the plan existed but

i 965 , 306 ) .

Df potential povter.
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1\r'thur Sd1lcs ·ingcr
H~

\'ll~ote

relates to us t hat t he

V/et'e

about

publicity the plan had received was easily sufficient to eliminate
the element of surprise and blow the fragile cover story.

The

information vtas public knowledge {even in Time), "but no one
in the interregnum seemed to feel final responsibility, and so
matters drifted along" {Schlesinger, 235).

J

The administration

drifted into the perfect failure.
The question
to exercise

po~mr

nO'.'t

becomes, why did those with the potentia 1

respond 1·1 ith only apathy? The effective

exercise of povter requires both an attempt and a response.

To

"b 1ame 11 the expe)·ts for attempting power exercise is to ignore
the acceptance of that power attempt.

\·lhy, then 5 did the group

respond to the coercive povte r attempts? After all, the political
damage done by failure exceeded any damage possible by cancellation.

Nhy, then, did the group pet·ceive as legitimate CIA

domination of the ·j nformation and p1·estmtation processes? After
all & the President and his senior advisors surely had legitimate
claims to make as \-Jell.

Hhy, then, did the gt·oup accept the

expert po\'ter exerci sed by Dulles and Bissell? Other information
\'las available if they had merely 1ooked.

In short, why did the

group allm~ matters to drift along?

These questions really ask v1hy those \-Jho could have exercised
povter did not do so.
p e rcc~p ti ons

For an ans1·1 er, I

tur~

to a 1·evi e\'J of the

and e>:pectutions of the group wh ich determined the

exerci se of p01·1cr·.
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Perceptions and Expectations of the Graue
Maybe we've been overso 1d on the fact that we
can't say no to this.
-Dean Rusk
Rusk's reflective statement occurred several days before
the final Ap ril 4 meeting, as he mulled the possibility of
drav·ling up a balance sheet detailing the plan's advantages and
disadvantages (Schlesinger, 257}.

For whatever reason, the

Secretat--y of State nevet· got at·ound to saying "no".

The other

deds·ion-maket·s considering the invasion plan vtere similarly
oversold on the fact that they could not say no.

Their own

perceptions of the situation and expectations of the decision
process overso1d them.
I.he Reali zat·i Oll_.2.'E the _QJ~port~!.0..!l.. to Exet•ci se POi·ter
The percept ual process limits the ability to r·ecognize or
to realize opportunities for power utilization through the
filtering and interpretative processes.
F"il tet~i IJ.[ of Information.

Presidents are dependent on theh·

advisors for a wide vari ety of infonnation necessary for decis·ions
(II a1pet~i n, 1972 , 310 ).

Usually advisors have their

m<~n

·interests

and mot·ivations wlrich l ead them to filter the infonnation t hey

prnvide the Pres ·ident.

Advis01~s

\•Jill be under strong temptat·ion

to provide the Pr-es ident only w\th infonnation he wou'ld like

to hear or they would like hi m to hear (de Riveri a,

232 ) ~

In th e case of the Bay of Pigs, Dulles and Bissell filtered
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their information and the President's by excluding all of the
concerned intelligence experts, including their own, from the
informative process (Schlesinger, 248).

In short, by controlling

the sources of information, Dulles and Bissell filtered infonnation available to the decision-makers.
Another process of infonnati on filtering is simply to
ignore or not "attend" t o relevant infonnation one does not
wish to hear.

In May of 1969 a carefully conducted poll of

Cubans indicated strong support for the Castro government and
virtually no hope of stimulating an uprising against Castro.
A report of this poll and its conclusions Has Hidely cit·culated
tht•oughout the government.

Over five hundred copies were sent

to the State Departme nt. the Hhite House. and other 1·elcvant
agencies.

The New Yotk Ti mes carried
---·----

st1·ess ing the 1·epo rt ' s conclus ions.

a r·athcr detai1 ed ac:count
Schl cs inger 9 reading the

report aftet· the invas ion, \•ti s hed he had seen it carl'ier.

Despite

the i rnp01·tance of the upt·ising in the invasi on's pl ann·i ng , the
l~e pot't

Nas never bt·ought to th e att ention of the group (de Ri ve t'i a,

41 -42 and Cant1·i1 ~ 4-5 ).

Pres i de nt Kennedy

\'J a5

actually aware

of a repor t in the 1-le\'/. .York Herald_ Jri bune wh ich conch!ded that
Cast\"O had strong suppor t among the Cuban pcop1 e,
these two

The negl ect of

both avail able and at l east ons known to

\~ports~

the

decision-makers~

the

p~ycho l ogica l

suggests that in formation

des i re not to "see" it

~tet:~_retat.i on

of Informati Q.ll·

l'>'i.IS

(~4a 1 ton,

filt er·ed by
46 ) .

Once data is recogni zed, it

i s still subject to t he interpretation of the in divi du<ll.
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Dull es

and Bissell were obviously so biased in favor of the plan that
any negative infonnation \'lhich got through their filtering
process would be likely to be interpreted 11 away 11 •

Bissell

recognized the strength of his conmitment to the plan and \·larned
the group to discount his bias (Schlesi nger, 241).

Dulles was

apparently less open and candid \'lith himsel f and the group.

To

the bitter end, he blamed the invasion's failure on a cancell ed
second air str ike (Dulles, 176).

Dulles an d Bissell viewed

information through the di started perspective of their ovm
prejudice (Halperin, 1971, 73).
John Kennedy and hi s closest advisors interpreted incoming
informati on and issues in their own particular ovtay as \'/ell.
Three f orces colored their perspective of the issues : (1) the
determined, t ough-mindadr.ess of a ne\'1, wi nning admi nistration;
(2) the crusading anti-communism of John Kennedy; and fusi ng

the firs t t'lto forces, (3) John Y.ennedy ' s tough , anti-Castro
speeches during the campai gn.
( l).

The Kennedy adm·i ni strati on vi rtua lly S\·Jept into office

\'lith the pol'"er, confidencet style, and determi nation to get

Arnerica ooving <.tgain.
tion \'las one of

The fe eling and i mage of the new administra-

viril·ity~

of toughness, and of action (Hal berstram.

39-41 ). Sorensen reports t hat doubts were. never expressed partly
out of a fea r· of being l abe"led ' soft' or undarin g in the eyes of
coll eagues (So1·ensen, 1965, 306).

Sm·ensen, moreover, repot·ts

that Kennedy perceived hi s approval "to be a test of his mettle"
(Sorensen, "1965,

305~306 ) .

Schlesinget~
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a'lso notes t hat \•/hil e the

invasion's proponents could "strike virile poses", the opponents
were afraid the CIA and the military would see them as "softheaded idealists" rather than the "really tough guys'1 they were
(Schlesinger, 256).

Remarkable admissions, these--unless one

recognizes that the new administration

did~

itself as "tough",

The rhetOl~ic and style of the Kennedy

"virile", and "daring".

administration was not a public image--it was real.

Virtually

everything that was said must be seen in this fl'ame\'IOrk.
John Kennedy \'las skeptical; sure, the plan was risky.

Sure,

But risky,

bold plans \'tnre the type that appealed to "the Kennedy spirit".
It \'las a plan of action and \'las therefore "irt·esistab"le" (Sidney,

124).

(2).

Hhile not really fitting the stl-ong anti-communism

mold of the i\cheson Ning of the party, John Kennedy Has not 11 about
to rus h ahead of events ••• by callin g fOl" changes in the almost
glacierlike quality of the Cold Har."
( Halberstram~ 21-24).

He \</as still a cold Harrior

In the 11 Spil' it of the Truman Doctri ne ,"

Kennedy eagerly sa\'t Soviet endm-sement of \'Iars of national liberation as a ch&llenge to the United States

(Ful brig~t,

S29).

Kennedy \<laS em er.thus·iastic suppo rter of methods to counter
guel'·r'ill a warfare t seeing t hi s as the mechanism of Soviet power
in the

futurE~

(llalberstram, 409).

hac\ excepti onu1ly

st ~"ong

Sor·ensen

re pol~ts

that Kennedy

anti -Castl'O fee 1ings \·Jhi ch may huve

effected hi s judgment (Sorensen, 30G) .

After all, Castro was the

ultimate example of a success ful r evo lution (although when he
b ec~.me

Co1m:wn i st is a matte1· of d·i spute ).
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(3}.

Kennedy's anti-communism and anti-Castroism, together

with his action-oriented, "get America moving" pose, resulted in
a political position which reflected and reinforced his bias.

In a study of major Kennedy speeches, Eckhardt and White point
out that the major expressed values were peace, military strength,
nonaggression, and determination.

Kennedy saw the Soviets as

aggressive and less peace- loving th an the United States (Eckhardt
and Hhite, 326-328).

Kennedy 's broad anti-com11uni sm focused on

Castro parti cul arl y .

In the 1960 campai gn, Kennedy repeatedly

press ed Nixon on the do- noth ·ing posi t ion of the Eisenhctr'ler
admini stration (not knowin g of the Bay of Pigs pl anni ng).

He

spoke of the need for a "serious off ens i ve 11 ag ains t Castro, presumab ly by t he anti -Castro f o1·ces \·lho offe r ed eventua 1 hope of

overth ro\'ling Cas tro.

These "fi ghte1·s

"h ave had vi rtua 11y no s upport f r om
36M38)

5

In

shot~t ,

f Oi"

OUI"

freedom", he noted ,

government 11

(\~a 1t on,

Kennedy ' s rhetori c t ef lected hi s strong

ant i - conmuni sm and his acti on- or i entation.

Hi s rhetori c

certainly provided t he bas i s to whatever coer ci ve powe r the CIA

exerci sed over him.
Hhether hi s t"hetor·i c refl ected his attitude or l'lhet her, as
Sorensen and Schles inger

re po rt ~

hP. \'Ius skepti cal an d agai nst the

p1nn, v1e cannot be certni no Popul at l eade1·s t end to be li eve
the i t own rhet ori c (Frank s 173- 174) .

t~oreov er,

Acheson l'eports

an early conversation \'lith John Kennedy \'lhi ch indicates the
Pres ident' s commitme nt to the pl an

1'/uS

gr ea.ter thcl.ll

and Sorensen ~': OL(ld h aV l~ us bel i eve (1-la"lton, 44 ) .
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Sc:lll esi n ge l~

He mus t remember ,

of course, that Sorensen learned of Kennedy's skepticism after
the invasion failed.

And schlesinger may have been overly eager

to find support in his President.

At any rate, Kennedy was

mindful that "history depends on who writes it" and may have been
r~ost

covering his tracks.

was a man of contrasts.

likely, I suppose, is that Kennedy

After all, skepticism of a bold and

daring plan may have existed along vlith an irrestible attract ion
to it, because it was bold and daring action.
These petceptua 1 influences he 1p explain Robert Kennedy •s
press uring of Schlesinger.
anti~communist,

Mo r eo ve r, the view of a tough-minded,

action-oriented Kennedy would be sommoJhat

favorable tovtards the pl an.

The coercive power of the CIA is

reinforced by Kennedy 's perce ption.

His \•li 11 i ngness to accept

the legitimate and expert power influences of the CIA are more
understa.ndab 1e when
influences.

\oJ·e

l'ecogni ze that he \'/anted to accept such

In sho1·t, v1e no\'1 have the picture of a skeptical

and worried President--\'Jhat if the invasion should fail?

But

the Pr·esident \'las also attr·acted by this bold p·l an of action-\oJhat if it \<Jorks?
succeed.

He \oJas

John Kennedy v1anted to be cony_}_!l_£ed it v1ould
l~eady

and willing to respond t o the pm·Jer·

exercised by Dulles and Bissel l.
Jh e_~J?.P..!:9.Pt'i Qte ~~ss

of the Exercise of

Powe l~

Po\'ler is effectively exercised only in si tuations where it
·i s appropriate or "right".

t o a lclrge

degree~

Rusk ' s f eeling of being "ovetsold" is.

the result. of a feel'ing of inappropriateness
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associated \'lith the use of power.

This feeling of inappro-

priateness helps explain the failure to act of many who could have
exercised powe r.

Appropriateness is detennined by the group's

etiquette, roles, and its task/interpersonal orientation.
Etiquette .

The decision-makers in the Bay of Pigs interacted

by a code of politeness and cordiality.

The 11 aura of assumed

consensus 11 which hung over the group was the result of a noncritical atnX>sphere.

Jan·is' interpretation of the non-challengi ng

demeanor is that it reflected the intet•persona 1 attraction between
Dulles and Bissell and the decision-making group (Janis, 1972, 46-

47).

I have already indicated that the referent power of Dulles

and Bissell \·ras limited and that the attraction Janis sees v1as

l ar gely a

t~esult

of expert

pm>~er.

In light of this interpretation,

ho\'1 does one exp 'ta·in the un de niable presence of a norm against
cri tical chnll enge cf the plan?

As vre shall see shortly, the

interpersonal or i entation of the group operat ed to support an
etiquette of pol ite, fri endly interaction.

The group was tra?ped

in an image of sophi sticatio n which dictated t he genteel , clubli ke atmosphere.

The operation of an intet·personal m·i entation

i mplies a code of conduct more general than the t aboo ag ainst
antagonizing ne\·l mernbet·s sugges t ed by J anis.
Rol es.

Role conceptions operate to define our area of

acceptab le or appropri at e behavior.

In at l east fo ul'' cases, t he

rol e concepti ons of t he members of the decision group operated
t o 1inrit the exerci se of pm1er.

The exercise of pm'ler by Dulles,

lli sse~ 11 p Rcb e1·t Kennedy, and Dean Rusk \·1as seen by each as an
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appropriate activity.
Arthur Schlesinger reports that he felt a mere historian
and Presidential aid had little right questioning the heads of
maj01· departments.

Schlesinger felt that as an aid, he could

speak at the request of the President but ought not to volunteer
his criticisms (Schlesinger , 240).

Of course, the deference of

a subordinate tmvat·ds his superior is a classic example of role
limitations.
Chester Bmvles was limited in his exercise of
similar deference.

powet~

by a

Upon learning of the invasion, Bowles did ·

not press his criticisms in the absence of his boss.

Instead ,

he waited until Rusk l'etumed to ask permission to express his
dissent (Schl es in9e r, 251 ).

Certu.in"ly , 13cMlest response to

Rusk's desire f c:r him not to press hi s case is a clear

sub or·dinate ro·ies.

But Bo\'Jles' silence in

matte•~

Rusk'.~. abs~ce

of

3 \~he n

as Act·i ng Secretary he could be f!xpected to speak out, is the
res ult of his

sp<~ci al

definit·ion of his ovm t•ole as Acting

Secretal''.Ye
Dean Rusk himself never got around to expressing his doubts
or permitting

Bo~t l es

to express his.

At the center of Rusk' s

remarkabl e si'!ence v1as hi s concept of the t•ole of a Secretary of
State.

Fonow·ing the example of hi s mentor and

nca1~- herop

Secretary Geor'ge Mal's hall , Rusk sav1 hi msel f as a counselor and
med·i ator, not as an advocate or critic.

Rusk "seemed t o fee 1 that

it \'las inappropr·int.e fo r the secre tary of state to do battle ·i n

the name of the department"

(Hi"l sman ~
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1971 , 169).

Rusk's role

as judge and

person~l

counselor to the President meant that the

political considerations that are the State Department's concern
are defended by an assistant secretary, if at all (Hilsman, 1971,
169).

In the case of the Day of Pigs, they were defended by no

one.

Dean Acheson, a different kind of Secretary of State, when

asked vthat it took to perform his job replied,
{Hilsman, 1967, 59).

11

a killer instinct

11

Dean Rusk was not a killer in the sense that

Acheson vtas.
Rusk's um'li llingness to exercise the pm'ler of his office due
to the limitations of his role concept is beautifully sunmarized
by David Halberstram :
Rusk had a great sence of the funct'i on of the
office; he believed in people playing their parts,
that and no more. He believed that if the
Secretary nnd the President did not agree, it \·las
virtually a constitution al crisis. When Rusk set
fortl1 hi s viev1s forcefully at a National Security
Counci l mee tin g it was a sure ~ ign th at he had
already conferred vlith the Pres ident , foun d that
they agreed and thus had been encouraged to speak
out \'/ithin the blweaucracy. But in al"l this,
there was one curious anomu ly; Rusk , \'tho had
t•i sen to Hhat \•tas the second most povterful
posi t ·ion ·j n the nation, did not really covet
power.~·· He was a modest man in a job which does
not entail modesty but demands that the incumbent
f ight and dominate an entire area of policy
making (H albet~str-am, 345).
Rusk d·id no t f i ght, and so the battle \·Jas lost by default.
The operation of role limi tations on other Presidential
advisors is l es s clear.

Sorensen ur·ites that many ad visors look

upon it as their "role" to be 11 medi ato t~s" \·lho support the
consensus

\~ hich

seems to be developing in order to aid the

Pres ident (S orensen, 1963, 61).
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Nat'ional Security Advisor tkGcot·ge

Bundy clearly sa\'/ himself as a mediator, whose role was to see
that every vievt was examined (Anderson, 324-325).

Bundy's role

in the Bay of Pigs is not \'tell documented, but it certainly \'las
not the fulfillment of the media tor role--seeing that a 11 vi e\'IS

\'tere fairly examined.
the aftermath of the

Perhaps that role concept developed in
11

perfect fai 1ure".

Task/Interpersonal

yl~ientatit?n.

The Kennedy administration

assumed office \'lith a strong sense of espirit de corps.

Their

style, their brains, their winning- -everything was "all-star"
(Halberstram, 39-40).

Upon assuming office, Kennedy and his

advisors had a sense of "enonnous confidence" in their luck.
They had \'/On the nomin ation and the elections against all odds
and nll comers.

Thus, entered the ne\'1 administration as the

\·rinni ng team (Sch 1esi nger, 259).

The sense of togetherness, the

feel ing of bei r.g on a \'1i nni ng team? and the fri en d'ly demeanor of
the group's meetings all suggest an orientation tO'Ytards interpersonal rc lations rather than tO'dards tasks.

An interpersonal ori entation is r.1arked by cooperative» nonchallenging interaction among members.

to stress differences in
is made.

po\'le t~,

It i s easy to see

The

g}~oup

does not Ni sh

so no challenge of asserted po>..ler

h0\'1

Dull es and Bissell, \•lho did not

feel the euphoria of the new day, Here able to step in, exert
their

power~

and go unchallenged.

To challenge the r espected

experts Nould have been to spoil the Nhole feeling.

No one felt

the r es ponsibility because no one cared that much about the task

at hand.
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The Desirability of the Exercise of Povmr
The interpersonal orientation produces an atmosphere of
consensus since there is a friendly, cooperative character to
the interaction among members. The atmosphere of consensus,
in turn, reduces the willingness of members to use power, since
the desirability of power exercise is partly dependent upon a
feeling of potential success.

In the interpers onal oriented

group, members do not perceive the possibility of success and
accordingly suppress their doubts.
Presidential advisors , like virtually anyone, are afraid
to take a stand alone. They fear that they vii 11 earn the
reputation of a nu·isance Ol" incUl" the 11 dis approbation 11 of the
gl"Oup (Sorensen, 195 3, 62 and de

Riveria~ 233).

Schlesinger

reflects the feeli ngs of one advisor who held back in antiC'ipaM
tion of failure vJhich 1•1ould 11 have accomplished l'itt1e save to
ga·in me a nume as

c1

nuisance 11 (Schl es ·inger, 255).

Rusk, too,

held back at the \·/hite House meetin gs, though he \'las a 11 penetrating 11
ques tioner at State Department meetings (Hil sman, 1967» 58).
Assuming the uncritical approach of the interpers onal
tation meant agreement, the deci sion-makers felt that the

orien ~

exp1~ssion

of their ovm dou bts would be a f uti 1e effort that could do th em
hann.

Perhaps they \•Je re mindful of the des i r ability of protecting

their future p01-1er by not
1969, 365}.

I'/ as t

i ng 'it on a 1os t cause ( Hil sman,

At any rate, the deci si on-makers may have seen the

desirability of p01-1e r exerci se as li m'itect by the appearance of
"un animity" and "ass umed consensus" (Jani s , 1972, 38-39).
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In st.nrrnary, the Bay of Pigs decision was a decision made
by a cohesive group of men under heavy pressures for

confot~ity.

The direction of confonnity pressures was to.'lards the policy

options advocated by the most effective user of power, the CIA.
Dulles and Bissell relied heavily upon the

expet~t

pa..1er they

possessed through control of infot·mation and options to dominate
A subtl e use of coer-cive and legitimate

eve ry meeting.

po~tJel"

and the limited use of referent power backed up the influence
exe rci sed fr om knoi'lledge and competence .
l~hy

powe r?

'"as th e CIA allcro'led to be the only sout·ce of expert

Why was the coer ci ve power effective in li ght of the

more pai nfu1 po1i ti ca 1 consequences of defeat? The ans\·Jers to
these ques ti ons are to be found in the perceptions and expecta-

ti on:> of the group .
of the

deci s·i on

The percepti on of t he

Kennedy

admin is tra t ion

process wo.s bi ased towards acceptance L>y the

PresidP.nt's toug h. action-or·i ented ant·i-ct'lfJ1J!lun ism.
li

The l'ole

mi tati ons of scvera·l major ad vi so~s kept them from

t he doubts \'/hi ch v10ul d have disturbed the

consens us" which hung
tile

ove l~

the group's

11

expr~ss i ng

atmosphere of assumed

meeting~:.

/\nd finally ,,

inte-rper·$ona1 orientv.t·lon of a new adrninist1·at.i on Heakened

concer·n fat· the task at

hand.~"No

one accepte d

fi nal

respon~dbi 'l ity,nt-

Llcct~ use

thete 1·:as more con cern with gettinq a'i ong than 1·r ith getting

th0. job

don ~.

The "i '11 us ion of un <111i m·i tyn \'lhi ch resulted from the

cooperative i friendly atmosphere of i nterp£!rson a 1 or·i entation
opE-~ i~atcd

th e i l'

t o t~educe

effort ~

the

des·irc~

to exerc·ise povtet· by members \!Jho sa\>J

as f11ti 1e and even har1.1ful .

sn

The members of the

administration had been "oversold" on their inability to say
no to the invasion plan, but it is doubtful that they ever knew
what hit' them.
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CHAPTER IV
THE AFTERI,1ATH TO THE BAY OF PIGS:
PRELUDE TO THE CUBAN HISSILE CRISIS

It's a hell of a way to learn things, but I
learned one thing from this business--that is,
that \'le \'lill have to deal with the CIA.
-John Kennedy
John Kennedy's view of the Bay of Pigs as an embarrassing
learning device made possible by the CIA reflects the attitude

of the entire administration. Hils man writes that the lessons
of the Bay of Pigs enabled Kennedy to avoid future mistakes
Soren~en

·in the Missile Crisis (Hilsman, 1967, 30 ).

reports

that Kennedy Has later 11 gr-ate ful that he had learned so many
major less on: ••• at so reliltive'Jy sma"ll and temporal'Y a cost 11
(Sotensen, 1965 ~ 308) .,

And Schlesinger concludes that the

l essons learned in t he failur-e turned t he Bay of Pigs from a
"mi sfortune 11 to a 11 benefit 11 vv hich

Cuba

i~

1962"

( Schles in ger~

11

Contdbuted to success in

297).

Hhat did they thi nl< they ho.d l earned?

Hho Nas, after John

Kennedy's almost pt·etent.ious acceptance of full l~espor.sib ility 11

r-eally the 'fift he t" of defeat'! The majot' analysis of the invasion
by

Sor~nsen

prob ably cl osely reflects Presi clenti a·l thi nki n~J .
.

-

Sorensrm learm;d of t he invasion only after- it fail ed thtough

e>:tens ive di!>tuss·ions with John Ke nnedy.
thc~~ fi:lct

And \'t hile this

process may 'li mit Sm"enscn' s creditabi'lity \·/hen

afte \"~·
sp.~ak·ing

about whnt happened, ·it ·inc1-eas es hi s creditetuili t y when speaking
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about what Kennedy thought happened.
Hhile recognizing Kennedy's errors, Sorensen's thrust is
towards the failures of the CIA.

"It was clear to him, 11 Sorensen

writes, "that he had · in fact approved a plan bearing little
resembl ance to what he thought he had approved.

Therein lies

the key to the Bay of Pigs decision 11 (Sorensen, 1965, 301).
Sorensen attributes the gap bebteen reality and Presi dential
perception to the ne\'mess of the administration, th e pt-essutes
of ti me, secrecy , and the disorgani zation of crisis planning.
Implicit in Sorensen's an alysi s is that the newness of the
administration li mited Kennedy 's judgment of his advi sors
{1neanin g he did not question "th e recogni zed experts ") .

The

pres sures of ti me an d secre cy i mposed by t he CI/\ limited "realis t ic
a1ternatives 11 and r es ulted in
strong

11

Voice of opposit:ion".

11

00

reali s tic appr ai sa111 , and no

And whil e t he ne\11 admi ni str ati on 'I'Jas

not yet organi zed for crisi s plannin g, ot her's s uch as the CIA and
the J oi nt Chi efs \'H!t' e
11

( S m·Ems~m ,

1965 ,

30 4·~ 30 5 ).

In s hor t , the

experts 11 in the CIA and t he ,Joint Chief s \-Je1·e cl early the

vill ains of the Kennedy pi ece and t he "f nthers 11 of def eat.

Robert

Kennedy re f lect ed J ohn Kennedy' s react·ion t o th e defeat by te lling

an aide the day after t he fai l ure th at on t he bas i s of t he in formnti on prf! Sented, the deci s ion \·Jas correct .
11

t he ·inf ormation

\~ as

"But 9 11 he

con ti n ued~

not \'tho'lly accu1·ute " (Guthmnn. 11 2).

The fi t·s t t an gi b 1e chan ge ·in t he admi ni strati on i n th e

afte m1at h of t he f3tty of Pi gs r cf l ects t he 1essons Kennedy thought

he had 'learned.

The powe r and cohes i on of t he
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11

9ener ali sts 11 i n

the administration increased while the power and attractiveness
of the 11 experts 11 declined.

Bundy and Sorensen gained great

influence on Kennedy (Anderson, 241).

Horeov~r,

Kennedy, a

generalist by nature, called around him men vthom he, in effect,
licensed to be generalists and to do what generalists do best-namely, question and distrust
114) .

e~p e rts

(Anderson, 234 and Guthman,

Bundy•s influence in particular increased in the \'la ke of

the apathy of Dean Rusk at State.

Bundy• s office became a

virtual "littl e State Department 11 , often dominating that
department in the foreign policy process (Halperi n, 1972, 31 5-

316 and Anderson, 318u319).
The second result of the failure of the Bay of Pigs vtas
the incl·ease in the toughness and determination of John Kennedy.
Kennedy felt he had appeared indec-isive to Khrushchev.

The

tough-nrlnded realists in the administration were strength ened.
Kennedy looked f'Or\'lard to his June meet ing vlith Khrushchev in
Vienna as the battleg1·ound 1·1here he could show Khl'Ushchev, faceto-face, that he 1·1as as tough as the old Russian.

The Pres ident

l eft Vienna badly shaken by the bu11ing given hirn by the ol der

Khrus hchev.

By the end of Vienna. and the Bay of Pigs, John

Kennedy sal't his central probl em

1·1 i

th Khrushchev to ba one of

convincing the Russ i an of his deten1ti nation and

net~ve (George,

98~99 and ll a lbEr~;tram~ 72).

Bundy, the tough

and

ll CI'l l .Y

povterful advisor, commented in

hi s calm, cool nwnner on the day after the i nvas·ion
a brick

thtou~1 h

the \'tindm·l (Halberstr am, 67"'68).
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failed ~

"just

A brick, the

feeling \'Jas clear, thrown by the experts.

And so the experts

were banished and the administration proceeded to the brink of
nuclear war in the missile crisis, confident a valuable lesson
had been learned.
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CHAPTER V
THE CUBAN tHSSILE CRISIS

It \'las nrM up to one single man. No comnittee
was going to make this decision.
-Robert Kennedy
Almost every President is reluctant to overrule
the determined opposition of his advisors as he
is to ve t o an act of Conqress. He rules, to a
degree, not only wi th their advice but with
thei \' consent.
-Theodore Sorensen
Robert Kennedy s trains for a cl irnax in his dramatic story
\'/hen he 1·1 rites that, folloh' ing days of de liber ation by a group
of advisors, the final decision would be one man's.

A~

Sorensen

notes, that singl e man would be highly unli ke ly to re ject the
adv·ice of a convnittee of advi sors including hi s
trusted f t ·iends.
consent.

bJ~oth e l"

and most

He deci dedt then , vlith th eir advice and

th e ·il~

John l(ennedy hi mself udmi tte d that t he s upport of th e

majority for t he course "He finally t ook ••• made it much easier 11
to decide (Sorensen. 1963, 8'1 ).
deci sion i s,

then~

The s tory of John Kennedy ' s

t he story of a gl"Oup of ad visors s triving

amidst conflict. for consens us.

·The
---

Dec·i sion ~

Conformitv
·- -...-----"-

!laving been ·infome d of the i nte l'J'i gence data in di catinq t he
pr-es ence of Sovi et offens ive nriss i1 es in Cubu . lJ olm V.ennedy pull ed
hi ~;

closest ad vi sors ar0tmd hirn.

The foUI~t ec n men in c'ludc d

11acJ~ rJna ~~a , Bundy ~ the ne\'-! CIA o·i rector Joh n l·~cCone, 's-!wensen ~ 1\..nul

Nitzc the Assistant Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson (Allison, 185).
The gt"oup, designated ExCom, met intensively from Tuesday,
October 16, until the final decision on Saturday morning, October

20.

In the beginning, these men 11 \'lhistled many different tunes."

Before the final decision on Saturday "a

majot~ity

whist led a single

tune: the blockade" (Allison, 200 and Janis, 1972, 144).

The

pr'Ocess by vthi ch this consensus emerged is a process of pov1er.

On the first day the choice seemed to 1ie betv-Jeen an air
stt·ike or some non-military option such :1s diplomatic action.
The non-military course \·Jas supported for·cefully by t\'!o po\'terfu l
advocates -- Robert

r~lacNamara

and HcGeorge Bundy.

Dean Acheson,

Paul tlitze, Douglas Dillon (Secretary of the Treasur.v ), and Dean
Rusk forcefully opposed the non-military alternatives.

The

President indiciltcd his t·ejection of such action at the outset of
the meeting and a.t the end confiY1ned h·is continued desire for
mil·itary action .

13y \·Jednesday, October 17. the non-mil itary

altem atives \'/ere virtually i gnored as th e ExCom focused on t vto
mil itary alternatives: tile air stt·ike and the blockade (seQ
Alli son~ 200-20?. and

Sch1es·inge r, 803 ) .

On th at Tues day and 1·/ednesday , the a·i r stri l~e seeme d to
appenl

3 trongly

to the members of ExCom.

Kennedy • s pteference

is revealed in a Wednesday conversation with United Nations
fl.mb a ssado i~

1\dlai Stevenson .

11eeting on l·!ed;'l es day, October 17,

\·lithou t the campaign·in9 President , l·lacNumara first 1nunched an

attack on the air strike al ternative .
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Moved by visi ons of nuclear

disaster, MacNamara switched his support to the naval blockade
as a vtay of blocking the more harsh air strike.

Robert Kennedy

may have S\'tung the balance of support towards the blockade when
he joined f1acNamara by

al~guing

the moral superiority of a

b1ockade to a surprise 11 Pearl Harbor" type of attack.
Acheson sharply dismissed Kennedy's

rnot~al

Dean

argument and his

analogy with Pe arl Harbor as emotional and intuitive rather than
serious and analytical.

13y the time John Kennedy returned on

Hednesday ni ght, 1·1acNamara, Robert Kennedy, and Sorensen ·had
formed a

11

tt~ipl e

a11iance 11 in support of the blockade.

The Joint

Chiefs, tkCone, nusk, Nitze, and Acheson lined up behind th e
blockade (Allison, 202-204 ; So rensen, 1965, 683-634; Schlesinger,
804~ 80 7;

On

Robert Kennedy , 37-42 ; and Acheson, 76).
Th ursd~y»

F'l~es·ldent.

Oct ober 18 s ExCom continued to meet \'tithout the

The bl ockade

(~me r ge d

as th e choi ce of the ma jority.

Th ot r~ vc ni ng t he Pres ·j dent re tumed to the group for a rneeti ng

runni ng we l l past midni ght .
joined t he bl oclwde
mor a'l at·guments.

g l~ou p

At t hat mee tin g Dill on switched and

l arge ly on t he basis of Robe rt Ke nnedy 's

nundy al so switche d ove r on t he bas i s of

1·1acNar:mra •s argument for "ma intaininQ th £~ options " by beginning
I.Y ith b"l ockade and mo ving t o an ait~ str ike if neces$ary .

The

Pres i de nt in di cvted a "tent at i ve ded s i on11 in f avor of the bl ockade
and ordered Sorensen t o begin speech

\'ll~it i ng

(Ahe l

7

80- 81 ;

Al 'li son~

205; Robert Kennedy, 43-46; c.::·td Sorensen ) 19G5t 69 1) .
On Fri day , Oct ober 19 , as th e Pres i dent prepar ed t o leave on

another campaign tri p t o keep up
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appea rances ~

the Joi nt Chi efs

prevailed upon him to delay his flight in order to plead for an
air stt"ike or an invasion.

FollcMing this meeting, Kennedy

called Sorensen, disgusted with the continued conflict, and
directed him and the Attorney General to "pull the group together
quickly."

Friday motning \'/hen ExCom met, it was clear the

President had left behind a restless group of advisors.
still waged \'lar against the blockade option.
uncertain of his earlier choice.
mild doubts.

Acheson

Bundy was again

/\nd Rusk expressed his usual

And, of courset the Joint Chiefs were certain

about v1hat they thought v1as necessary for the nation •s security.
Robert Kennedy, striving for consensus, flatly stated that his
brotl1£!:. could

nevet~

order a surprise ai t"

stt~ike.

Sorensen,

t1·ading off his s pecial relationship vlitll t he President and
frus trated by his infla.med u1 cer~ \'larned that "v1e at•e not serving
the President \·te11. 11

By ni ghtfall Friday, the air str·ike vtas a

lost cause .

Oean Acheson, the leader of the air strike proponents,

left fot· his

l~a ryl and

usefulness.

Robert Kennedy th en called the Pt·r.si dent ·in Chicago

fann feeling he had come to the end of his

and told him the group vtas

11

ready to meet \'J ith him 11 (Abe l, 83- 89s

Allison , 207··208 ; Sch l es inge r,

806~80 7;

Sorensen, 1965 ,

692~ 693 ;

and Robert Kennedy, 47-48).
On

Sa tut~day ~

October 20, the group approved or ac:qui esced in

the o·lockade option.

Far from un an i mity, a

el even fo r t he blockade and s i x
voting for the b·l ockade, the

fm~

stt~<\\'1

vote indicat ed

the ai r strike.

Pl~es i de nt stn~ssed

/\lthough

th at it was a

first step only , wh i ch di d not rule out a future air strike.
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Sorensen \'lrites· in exaggeration that by the time the President
finished, "those members of our group \'lho had cane to the meeting
still advocating an air strike or invasion had been essentially
\'Ion over by the course he outlined...

The v1eakness of the

confonnity p1'ocess Sorensen sees is reflected in the bitter
battles which intnediately broke out over the diplomatic moves
to accompany the blockade and in the frequent conflicts throughout
the remainder of the crisis, as ExCom faced the choices forced by

the "maintaining the options 11 approach ( Allison, 208-209; Sorensen,
1965, 694; Schlesinger, 808-809; Robert Kennedy, 48; and Gem·ge,

127-128).
Hos t membe rs of the Kennedy circle viewed the missile crisis
decision p'f'Ocess as the antithesis of the Bay of Pi gs process.
It

\'las fOl'

them the ultimate test of the lessons they h ad le atned.

It Has a·imos t a.n atonement for· past sins (see !1acNamara in R.
Kenned_y, 14 and Guthman, 11 2) .
missil e crisis as the

11

Irving Janis likevlise sees the

counterpoint" of the failures of the Cuban

fiasco a year and a half before.

J ani s credits the group with an

openness and willin gness to criticize th at existed despite the
nonna l conformity pressures.

This openness \'las the t·esu lt , Jan·is

feels, of a ne;'/ group norm ope rating to req uire cr-iticism (J anis,
1972 ~

142- 150).

The question is~ th en, to \'/hat extent did pressures

tm·nn·us con fonni ty operate? Conformity pressures ope rate, if
successf"u1 s to reduce openness and cr-itici s m, once a consensus has
nm2rgcd.

Jani s himself indicates an occas ion al doubt about the openness
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of the ExCom.

John Kennedy forced his decision on the group for

a mi 1i tary option, and 11acNamara and Bundy qui ck1y abandoned
their position in the face of Presidential opposition (Janis,
1972, 142).

One cannot escape the feeling that the President

decided in favor of the blockade on Hednesday, and the discussions
Thursday and Friday Here to 11 bri ng the hawks around" (Hil sman,
1971, 129-130).

After all, the President must have the support

of his advisors, and persuasion is a more lasting force than is
command (Hilsman, 1971, 24-25 and Neustadt, 34).
The "e.ngineers of consensus" on Thursday and Friday were
Robert Kennedy and Sorensen, \-Jho acted on the basis of their
special relationships to "bring the group around 11 on Friday and
to solidify the conversi ons of Dillon and l3undy (Alli son, 207The psychological rejection of Acheson, indicated by

209).

his sudden depa r t ure and bitter attitude, and the subsequent
attacks on Stevenson for his Saturday argument for patient
diplomacy, indicate the operation of a strong conformity pressure
(Ha1berstl'am, 28 ; Halton, 119; and Allison, 209).
Des pite the conformity pressures, Jani s is right to a deg reeo
There \'tas

in the

D.n

openness of conflict and a di sp 1ay of pm'ler present

~rlssi 1e

the 13ay of

crisis decision-making process that was absent in

Pi~J!;.

The exercise of pmver, so c1ea1· and so diverse,

determined \'thi ch opt·i on th at the eventua 1 confonni ty pressures

would opernte around.
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The Effective Exerci se of Power
And Crispin Crispin shall ne'er go by,
From this day to the ending of the world,
But we in it shall be remembered;
We fe\'1, \<Je happy fev1, we band of brothers.
-Shakespeare
The Bard's comment about the end of the world has a slightly
frighteni ng note to it in conjunction with the missile crisis.
More frightening is the fact that the sense of comradeship in
ams represented by the Bard v-1as a favorite piece of Kennedy
verse (John Kennedy often referred to his

adv i sOl~s

as 11 \·Je ban.d of

btothers 11 ) . The role of these feeli ngs
of an eli te esoirit de
...

--.~-- -

corps in the determination of the outcome of ExCom deli berations
was a si gnificant one.
Re\'tard Pm·ter
/my
powet~

President or any Secretary of State exerci scs reward

over· his advisors. The

pm<~e r

of a Pres i dent to rm·tard

advi sors he likes or app reciates i s a natural function of the powe r
of the office (Heustadtt 179).

Seen in this li ght , the President ' s

ini t ial instruct i ons to ExCom that "something be done 11 seems
capa.ble of produc-ing tile quick retreat of 1'1acNumara and Bundy.
Afte r

a ll~

qi vcn the determin ed oppositiot) of their superior,

they had much to gain hy conformity.
Coc r ci ve P01·1er

Opposit i on t o a superior also threatens th e punish ment a
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superior can often exercise.

Certainly, John Kennedy did not

thr-eaten 13undy and t·tacNamara, but they must have been mi ndful of
the treatment Chester Bm·lles received following the 13ay of Pigs.
And John Kennedy's harsh treatment of Adlai Stevenson's late
Saturday dissent must have served notice to those \•lho contemplated future deviance.
Kennedy sharply attacked Stevenson at the

Satw~day

meeting, leaving Stevenson badly \•Jounded (Abel, 95-96).

t1oreover,

despite repeated denials, subsequent press stories quoting a high
Hhite House official as sayin9 Stevenson 11 \·/anted a t1unich" and
generally being hi9hly critical of the UH ambassador's role \•Jere
"leaks" from Kennedy.

A magazine editor has revealed that the

Munich l ine was from Kennedy hi ms elf, who insisted it be printed.
As in the Bmtles case, Kennedy Has not adverse to using the
damaging coercive pov1er of "leaks 11 to punish those \'lho crossed
him \•Jhe n he \'las in no mood fot• it (Halberstram , 27).
Coercive pm·1e1· is also exercised by a dissenter in a
Pres i dential deci sion.

The use of leaks to charge a l ack of

consultation or just to distort the picture of the decision
process (as Kennedy in Stevenson's case) i s a major source of
coercive power (Sorensen, 1963, 80 ).

Certainly, Acheson, the

Joint Chiefs, and Steve nson as dissenters . possessed this
potenti a1 pm·1er.
But J ohn Kenn edy 's response to this potenti al threat was
to cover hi s tr·acks carefully.

Kennedy ' s blockade decision

was carefully phrased as a first step only to reflect his desire
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for a clear record (Hilsman, 1971, 129-130).

Further, the

President met i ndi vi dually to consult \·l ith Acheson, thus
weakening Acheson's basis for ccxnplaint (Allison, 207).

Kennedy

personally sought the advice of the Air Force Tactical Command
on the military fe asibility of a surgical air stri ke and del ayed
his Friday trip to hear out the militaty , t hus weakening their
cl ai ms to inadequate counsel {Allison, 124 and 206).

Stevenson.

consulted late on Saturday, October 20, mi ght have fel t sh ut out ,
but Kennedy attacke d Stevenson f irst in an effort t o dis credi t
any fut ure criti d sm Stevenson mi ght make.

In

shot~t ,

J ohn

Kennedy ' s response t o t he possibil ity of punis hment was to cover
hi s t r acks , not t o fo 11 0\'J the pat h of dissent.
Referent PO'.<Jer
J ohn Kennedy \'loul d cl ear·)y have been l ess abl e and \'li 11 ing
t o offset the coerci ve effects of di ss ente r·s i f MacNamat·a t
So remsen, and his brother had been among them.

pov:er of these

thr~e

But the

refel~ent

made i t unli ke ly that he evet· considered

opposing them.
Rober t Kennedy ' s influence over hi s brother is vJell -kno\'/n
and

extensive.

lie

exerci sed a personal, i nti mate infl uence

unsu r pnssed by il.nyone el se.

Sorensen ' s infl uence \'laS mo1"e

-

genen lli zed but equal ly strong i n i ts ovm \\'ay.
mnn virtual ly absorbed by John Kennedy.

Sorensen was a

He sai d vti thout

embar-rassment or regret that he "h ad given eleven years " of his
l ife for John Kennedy, and fol' hi m duri ng t hat time, "he (John
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Kennedy) \1/as the only human being \•tho mattered."
divorce is perhaps understandable.

His 1963

At any rate, Sorensen was

the major liberal influence on John Kennedy's political thinking
(Anderson, 223-224).

Robert HacNamara \·las si milarly a personal

friend and a popular and much-admired figure in the Kennedy
j

circle (Halberstram, 245-246).
Of course, all of these men Nere influenced by the President
and by interpersonal attraction.

MacNamara, for example, became

a virtual "br·other" in the Kennedy family, being call ed upon
many times in the tragedi es that fell upon them in t he years
ahead.

Asked once \'tho his friends Nere, MacNamara could only

say, "the Kennedys-- 1 like the Kennedys" (Halberstram, 223- 224).
Sorensen' s devotion to Kennedy is pai nful1y obvious, and he
took much ribbing due to his tendency to copy even the social
manneris ms of his President (Ande t·son, 2 42 ).

The attracti on

beU.tecn Robert Kennedy and Robert 1·1acNamara which grev1 during
the missile crisis receives eloquent testi mony from 1'1acNamara's
for\·lard to Kennedy' s book : "And cotm1on

expos Ul~e

to danger forges

bonds and understand·i ng betvteen men stronge r than those fonne d
by decades of close association.

So it \'las that I came t o kna.'l,

aclmi re ~ and 1ove Robet' t F. Kennedy by his behavior dut•i ng the
Cuban mi ss "il e crisis" (in R. l(ennedy, 13) .

Thus, the suppot•ters of the blockade fonned a "tri ple
alliance 11 of the Pres i dent's natural fri ends , supporters, and
11

urot hel'S11 •

Conttast this gt·oup of natu ra1 associates with the

group of outsiders s uppot·t ing the air strike: Acheson , t1cCone,

73

the Joint Chiefs, and (sometimes ) Rusk.
Acheson has made his personal aversion to the process of
decision-making in ExCom quite clear.

His personal dislike

for the emotional Robert Kennedy and his bitter and intense

!

exchanges \'lith the President • s brother could not he 1p but a1i en ate

J

Acheson from John Kennedy .

j

Moreovet~,

Kennedy was posed between

the Stevenson and Acheson foreign policy \'lings of his party and
thus found it difficult to be personally attracted to either man
(Hal berstram, 21-24; Acheson, 76-77; and Abel, 64-65).
John

l~cCone • s

appoi ntmcnt as Dit-ector of the CIA

~wul d

be

comparab le in shock value and diversity of opinion to, say,
Richard Nixon's appointment of Daniel Ellsberg.
California milli onaire

~lith

a tarnished right

McCone was a

\'ling~

He Has

John Kennedy's third choice and \'las primarily a political ploy
to keep the conservatives on the Hill off his back.

That McCone

did p but it did not \'lin him v.ny popularity contests at the White
House.
t~cCo ne

For examp·le, Stt·om Thunnan said on the Senate floor that
"epitorn) zes vthat has made America great." Hith friends

like that, McCone did not need enemies.

llis friends \<Je re not

Kennedy's friends, and that says it all (Halbers t 1·am , 152- 153).
The Joint Chi efs exerted virtually no referen t power over
thE! admin istNti on.

Genet·ul 1·1ax\'Jell Taylor, who

~1 as

Chainnan of

the Joint Chi efs, possessed some personal inf'luence (Halberstram,
162) ~ but v1as overshadoi'led by the 1ess subtle and impressive
membel~s

of the Staff.

The President vi e1·1e d the military as

insens iti ve to the forces of world pol itics and was appa ll ed by
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their

narr~~

military parochialism.

An example of the insensi-

tivity with vthich the military vim·ted the international scene
is provided by the voca 1 Air Force Chief, Curtis Let·1ay.

On

Sunday, October 28, after the Russians had agreed to \'li thdra\~
their missiles, he urged the President to 11 attack

~1onday

in any

case 11 (R. Kennedy, 118-120 and Allison, 206).
FollO\~ing

the \'leak performance of Dean Rusk and the State

Department, the President•s confidence and trust of Rusk slipped
Rusk 1 s conception of his role

badly (Hilsman, 1971, 163-164).

and his total lack of 11 Kennedy style" sepatated him from the
President's circle of friends.

Unlike MacNamara, Sorensen, or

Bundy, John Kennedy could never bring himself to call Rusk by
his first name .

John Kennedy and Dean Rusk vtet·e not on the same

\'lavel ength at all (Halberstramt 343-346).
A final word about Adlai Stevenson: Stevenson labored under
the additional burden ot· being regarded as weak and indecisive

l>y the Kenr.edys.

He \'las the subject of 11 thinly veiled contempt"

by the

l~hit e

House and of humiliating jokes about his indecisive-

ness .

He was someone "to t ake Jacki e to the theatre"

stram,

26 ~ 28).

Ped1 aps Kennedy

\~oul d

(Halber~

have been less hm·s h on a

man he did not find so contemptible.
Picture how things must have looked t o Pres ident Kennedy
retu rn-ing the evening of Hednesday , Octobe r 17.
swung over in support of the blockade.

:~a cN am a l~a

had

He had received strong

support frorn the P1~es i dent 1 s brother Hho used mora·l arg uments

about \·that a Pres i dent could nnd could not do.
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F·inallyr Sorensen

added his support.

Against the President's 11 band of brothers 11

was Acheson, an ex-Secretary of State \'Jho reflected to the cold
warrior \·ling of the party.

There \'las McCone, the conservative

friend of Strom Thurmond, et cetera.

..I

There were the Joint Chiefs,

who really \'/anted an all-out invasion.
\'las more indecisive than convinced.

And there was Rusk, who

Bundy's presence in the air

strike camp \'las the one advantage in terms of referent po'I'Jer
they had.

And it took a 11 day Thursday and heavy pressure Friday ,

but he too was finally won over (Allison, 206-207 ).

Given the

pO\'Ier of identification to induce change in personal beliefs
and gi ven the strength of the referent power operating in favor
of the blockade, there is little doubt that J ohn Kennedy acted
with his advisors' advice and consent.
Legitimate Power
Exerci se of l egitimate pm'ler is a natural assumed function
of the man who is President.

His orders and his decisions are

accepted with littl e questioning.

Acheson never had any

i 11 us ions about Hho ma de the fin a1 decision.

And yet» even the

legitimnte pm·mr of the President is not a pov1e r that can be
taken for granted.
The military responded to the Presidenti al decision by

pled3ing t o loyally can·y out hi s o1·ders.
\'laS

blatantly igno re a Presidential o1·der.

Hhat the military did
The President ordered

th e blockade line to be moved from BOO mi l es out to 500 miles out

to pr-ovide the Russians \'li t h more time for· decision.
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In a classic

example of the \•/eakness of legitimate po\'ler, Secl-etary MacNamara
confronted Naval Chief of Operations Anderson at the war room in
the Pentagon.

Foll~~ing

a heated exchange about the operation,

Anderson ended the conversation by saying, "Now Mr. Secretar·y, if
you and your Deputy \'li 11 go back to your offices, the Navy wi 11
run the blockade." · As evidence novt makes clear, the Navy ran
the blockade 800 miles out,

1~hich \~as

in di re ct contradiction

with a Presidential cotrmand (Allison, 130-131) .
The explanation is that the legitimate po\'mr of the President
was limited.

Presidential operation in the missile crisis over-

stepped the bounds of legitimate Presidential power in the eyes
of the military in two ways.

First, the Pr·esident ignored the

hallowed tradition and the basis of militar·y command , the chain of
command, by communi eating orders directly to officers on ships at
sea.

Second, the President \'las making tactical decisions about

loca.l matters \·Jhich are the unquestioned right of local commanders
onlyo

Even top generals and admirals do not question the local

battl efi eld judgment of the commander in chat·ge.

By overstepping

the l egitime1te reach of his po·det·, the Pres ident could not count
on tile unquest-ioned obedience of the

milita l~y

(Allisonp 129-132) •

•Exe.c:_':t_l>_9yte!:.

Expet·t poi>/el" in c ludes the control of individual sk·in and
i.t bi1ity as wen as the control ove r information.
sec~n

\·Je have

<>'~ready

heM the skills of "genet·a·lists 11 l ·ike ~1ac.:Narna l'a, Robert

Kennedy, Sorensen, Bundy, and Acheson had become highly prized
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fo 11 o;.ri ng the Bay of Pigs.

McCone and the Joint Chiefs, by

comparison, were the institutional incarnations of the expertise
now so distrusted.
examp 1e, about

The President was openly

Lel~ay •s

skeptical~

for

assertion that the Soviets \'toul d blandly

accept an American invasion of Cuba (R. Kennedy, 36).
Hhile the pm'ler that comes from being an "expert" may have
been reduced in the aftermath of the [3ay of Pigs, the power
h'hich comes from the contl'Ol of information remained a constant.
~1acNamara

particularly excelled in the use of facts, figures,

and kno.'lledge (Halberstram, 234-235 and Hilsman, 1967, 43-44).
Uis early argument that the missiles did not pose a significant

military threat may have been impressive, but ExCom \'laS not
dealing with matters governed by quantifiable facts.

ExCom \'J as

persuaded ne t by the alternation of military ba·lance, but by

damage to United States prestige. MacNamara could not use his
fac~s

and stati stics to refute this

shot't, the response to

l~ucN amara's

cn~gument

(GeO\'ge , 92).

In

control of information was to

go around it by raising issues about which quantification was not
avail ab lc:.
\~h en 1 ·1adl am a l~a

turned instead to support of the b1ocko.de,

his \'las not Robert Kennedy's moY'al argument, but first and foremost an argument based on one critical piece of information.
Joint Chiefs had advi sed the President thnt a surgical

a.it~

The

strike--

one which would only take out the offensive missiles - -was
11

milii:arily infeas·ible." The Joint Chiefs in staad attempted to

li mit that option by pushing their own option f0r an ai r strike
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of virtually all military installations and eventually an invasion
(Gelb and Halperin, 30-31 and R. Kennedy, 34).
This infonnation had a p01·1erful influence contrary to the
hope of the military.

The military hoped the information would

serve to limit the air strike option and thus pave the way for
the more dramatic military invasion.

It is, of cou1"Se, a classic

example of the idea of limiting options through expert power that
Halperin outlined.

Hhat the information did do was to eliminate

· the air strike option and thus pave the \>Jay for the blockade.

The

military v-tas too i nsensi ti ve to see what they were doing in their
insistence that a surgical air strike was impossible (Allison, 206).
The po\'tel" of the information is implied by Acheson, who
complained

late \~

that 11 the na\"rO\'t and specific proposal" he favored

"became obscured and complicated by the trimmings added by the
militar-y 11 (Acheson, 76) .

I Hould call un invasion a little more

than trimmings , but the point is that military contr·ol of information provided some control over options (Ge lb and Halperin , 30).
Allison wr·ites that the information was wholly inaccur·ate
and that such an air strike was in fac t fe asible.

No one in

ExCom , hm·.'ever, ques tioned the expert judgment of the mi 1itar·y .
Civili an l eaders, unaccustomed to examin ing the details of
mil-i tary pl ans, di d not question

~!!l..l

an air strike must be followed

by att ackin g ail m"ilitat·y install ations nnd eventual ly an invasion.
The virtually unquesti oning acceptance of the expert advice of the
Joint Chiefs suggests that the Admini stration learned its l esson
only

pa~tly

(Alli son, 124-126 and 205 and Sorensen, 1965 , 691-697 ).
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In sunmary,

r~acNamat·a

and Bundy's abandonment of non-military

options \'las a result of the reward and referent power exercised by
a determined President and the weakness of MacNamara•s expert
powel' in a non-quantitative argument.

The choice of the blockade

by the President \'las largely the result of superior referent
powet· exercised by the a 11 i ance of Sorensen, Robert Kennedy, and
~1acNamara .

The blockade received further substantial assistance

by the military 1 s unvritting pt·ovision of information indicating
the military infeasibility of the ail' strike alternative.
A number of unansvtered questions remain: ( 1)

Hhy did John

Kennedy exet·cise power on behalf of military options so early?
(2 ) Hhy v1as the advice of the mil'itary accepted \tlithout questioning

by a group

Ol''i gi

a1temative?

nally favornb ly dis posed to the b ·1 udgeoned

The contras t between th e consensus- laden aura of the

Bay of Pigs and the open conflict of the missile cris i s sug9ests
CJ.

final questi on: \'J hy \'las power exercised more freely and open ly

in the missile cri sis?

For an answer to these ques tions, we turn

to an exami nati on of the perceptions and expectations of the decision-

rno.ki ng group.

Courage is the t hing.
goes.

All goes if courage
-Sir J ames 13arri e

Li ke th e knights of yore which Rarrie brings to mind , John
Kennedy ScM h·i s cnuraqe being challenged by the Red Knight
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Khrushchev banishing a silver missile.

Feeling his courage and

will challenged by the old man who bullied him at Vienna and
feeling pressured at home by opponents to live up to his rhetoric,
John Kennedy entered the arena svtinging (George, 98-99 and Halton,
103-120).

The Realization of the Opportunitx to Exercise Power
The perceptions of the Kennedy administration of the events
of early October operated to 1imi t opportunities for pol'ter uti 1ization.

Viewing the world through their particular perspective,

the Kennedy administration hardly considered the non-military
options.

Three forces shaped the perception which 1imi ted the

choices.
(1) .

The administration vieHed the \1/0l·ld through red, white,

and blue glasses.

The strong anti -communism of John Kennedy was

less warlike than that of Acheson, but still 1"el11Jtithin the
bounds of Cold \-Jar tradition (Fulbri ght, S29).
rhetoric and his foreign policy reflected an

Kennedy's campaign

ant i ~ corm1unist

feeling

of which the 13ay of Pigs is but one example (Halton, 3··10 and 202234).
(2).

Hhile Kennedy 1 s policy attitudes tnay have stl'add1ed the

1i ne bebteen Acheson and Stevenson, his method of
the ha rd- liner Aches on approach.

opel~ati on \~ as

The drive for tough ness, the

maschi smo quality, the dete rmination, all in ct·eased

fa illlres in Cuba and Vi enna.

follm~ing

the

John Kennedy's rhetor·ic reflected

his drive for military strength and determin«tion and his

stereotypical view of the Soviets in an aggressive position.
Sure, he wanted peace and non-aggression, but the Soviets had
to be sho;-m he could be tough, too (Eckhardt and Hhite, 238).
Cold warrior Joseph Alsop rejoicing in Kennedy's Stevenson image
and his Acheson toughness said after his election: "Isn't he
marvelous?
( 3).

A Stevenson with balls" (Halberstram, 24).
/1 third force shaping the perception of the October

crisis wcs the vtatchful eye of the voter.

\~ith

the election

in November, the public was watching as Republicans gleefully
tutned th e tables on Kennedy who had attacked Nixon so hard on ·
Cuba in 1960 (Abel, 12-13) .

Senators Keating, Capehart , Thurman,

and Goldwater \'/ere needling th e administration of the rumore d
pres ~nce

of Sovi et missiles on Cuba.

The needle drew blood.

Since tile Bay of Pi gs, Cuba had been t he administration's ''heavi es t
political cross " and in

1962~

the Republican Conqress ionul campa i gn
11

corr:mittee pronounced Cuba to be the
campaign (Sorensen, 1965, 669).

domina.nt i ssue 11 of the

In response to this pressu ring

Kennedy i ssued statements on September 4 and 13 \•Jarning that the
United States \'IOuld not to lerate the introduct ion of offensive

weapons into Cuba (Wal ton, 108; George , 91; and text s in Lar s on,
3-4 and 15- 16 ) ~

These f orces shaped the Pres ident 's perception of the
from the velA.Y beg inning.
of the m·issiles \'las anger.

ange \~ed

Cri si s"

Kennedy ' s initi al r esponse \'lhcn told
He was

deceived (Sch l es inger, 80 1-802 ) .
of

11

11

furious" at having been

Robert Kennedy echoed the feeling

bet1·aya l to an aide the next day=
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11

He kidded ourselves,

the Russians have lied in their teeth" (Guthman, 118). The
feeling of having been

bet~ayed

and tricked produced similar

shock and anger among other members of ExCom (R. Kennedy, 27
and Walton, 117).
After the initial shock, Kennedy's more reflective feeling
was that this was the challenge he had been expecting Khrushchev
to make since Vienna.

He felt that he now faced the "supreme

risk 11 that l'tas necessary fot· him to face in order to convince
Khr·ushchev of his determination.

To convince Khrushchev, Kennedy

could not use words; "he has to see you move," the President told

a reporter in the aftermath of Vienna (George,

99 and Walton, 118-

Accordingly, Kennedy decided early aga·inst non-military

119).

alternatives.

As Robert Kennedy remembers , "He knew he \\'O uld

have to act •••• Hhat that action would be \·tas s ti 11 to be determined.

But hH Has convinced from the beginning that he \-Joul d

have to do someth·inq" (R. Kennedy, 33).

That action \'tas military

action, as the President made clear at the first meeting on
Tuesday.
The desire fOl'" military action was supported by the politics
of that Octobe1·.

On the fi l'St

earlier statements on Cuba.

Tu esday~ hf~

sent for· a copy of his

These statements "made it unlikely

that he \voul d respond" by anything short of mi 1i taty action

(Sorensen, 1965, 34- 45 ). Thus, did the considerations of high
strategy (must impress Khrushchev) and of politics (must i mpress
voters ) r-trin force each other· to 1·ul e out all alternatives sho r·t
of mi"litary nct·ion (Steel,

219 ~2 20) .
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The feeling that he \'Jas responding to a challenge to his
courage is reflected in the President's announcement of the
blockade.

Kennedy placed great stress on the .. deliberate decep·

tion and offensive threats 11 of the Soviet move.

Kennedy then

tenned the action a 11 deliberately provocative and unjustified
change in the stat us
~~and

41-46).

~

v1hi ch cannot be accepted ••• if £!:!!.

conrnitment are ever to be trusted again .. (in Larson,

"Our

courage"··~hovl

much it sounds 1ike the fears of

being 11soft" rather than .. really tough 11 which \'/ere expressed in
the Bay of Pigs.

Even poor, soft Adlai Stevenson \·las pressed

into service to del i ver a tough, White House- supervised attack
on the Russians in the United Nations.

Stevenson attacked the

Soviet "nuclear decei t 11 so hard one almost \'/Onders whether the
missiles bothered anyone at all (in l arson, 137-141).
John Kennedy ' s ·; nterpretati on \.,ras 1argely shared by those
membet-s of Ex Com who eventually s uppor·ted the b1ockade.

The

Joint Chi efs' v·iew of the event 1.,ras even more strikingly anticommunist and tough-minded.

The Chiefs vi ewed the missiles as

an opportunity to l aunch the invasion to get rid of Castro,
which they had wanted since before the Bay of Pigs.

Their

single~

minded devotion to this alternative explains the insensitivity

that l ed them to bludgeon the air stri ke option they woul d have
p1·eferred to the b1ock ade.

The militaty ' s in abil i ty to see the

consequences of thei r action illustrates how easily our interpretation of events can distort our judgment and preclude the exercise

of power on behalf of options we prefer (All ison, 123- 126 and 206
B4

and Halperin, 1971, 74-76).
In short, the perception of John Kennedy resulted in an
interpretation of events which ruled out the use of power on
behalf of non-military alternatives.

The perception of the

Joint Chiefs resulted in an interpretation of events \'lhich
ruled out the non-invasion alternatives.

In their zeal the

military also ruled out the only viable alternative to the
blockade they opposed so strongly.
The Appropri ateness of the Exercise of Power
While the limiting of options was taking place, the atmosphere of the group a 11 0\'ied substantia 1 freedom to appropriately
exercise pov1er on behalf of those t\>IO options \l'hich remained •

.~ ti_qt~e~~~-·

The group etiquette required a more open

exe1Aci se of fJO\tler among eq uals.

The criticism of alternatives

v1as encouraged as appropri ate hehavi or· by the group.
though a group nonn had developed

appt~oving

It

\'laS

as

crit·icism in the

aftermath of the Bay of Pi gs (Jani s, 1972, 149-·150).

There

is vii despread agreement <1mong the participants that the meetings
wet~

open cl ashes of opinion among 11 equals" (Sch1esinger, 802-

803; Aches on, 46; R. Kenn edy, 46; and Sorensen , 1965, 679).
Of cour:;et as Acheson do es note, the members of t he group
were not equa 1 in terms of power.

Rather~

they '\·Jer·e eq ua1 in

the sense that no individua·l assumed the posH·ion -or --role
"-

of a leade1· or othen-li se exerci sed authority of position.

For

exampl e, Paul Nitze openly clashed with his superior , Robert
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MacNamara at the opening of the first meeting (George, 92).
The limitations of roles operated to reduce effective

Roles.

po\'ler in tv.1o cases and to expand it in one.

Dean Rusk's role

concept of the Secretary of State as the personal advisor of the
President had the disadvantage of seriously limiting his influence.
Rusk attempted to follow in the footsteps of his mentor, George
Marsha 11. but he did not have

r~a rsh a 11' s

reputation, v1hi ch provided

!1arshall' s pov1er base. The result vtas that Dean Rusk had little
effect on the outcome (Halberstram, 344 and Hilsman , 1971, 169).
McGeorge Bundy's role of mediator seeing that every option
was heard may account for his strange behavior.

Initi ally

supporting a diplomati c approach , t hen switching to the air strike,
and then s l ov1ly and hesitantly mo ving into the blockade camp, Bundy
may have been actin g out his role by seeing that eve ry
exarr~i n ed.

recalls.

11

11

v ·ie~tJ

was

1 al most del i berate ly stayed in the minori ty, .. he

1 fe'lt

Vf':i"Y

st1·ongly that it was very important to keep

the President's choices open 11 (Anderson,

324~325 ).

Hhile I am

uncomfortab l e vlith attributing such control and ca·lculation t o a
decision- maker during a ct•i s is , Bundy ' s ro 1e certainly 1i mi ted hi s
power to advocate any one option.

He, of course , exerci sed a

pm"'er in the direction of free options as a goal .
Finally, the role of the Joi nt Chiefs as t he sol e and
unquest·ioned providers of nri l ita1Ay judgments was a strong one.
The dil emma facing civilians \llhen faced with military judgments
is t1·10fo l d: f i rst , thete are few al ternative soul'ces of i nformation and udv i ce on military matters; and second, the prestige and
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influence of the military on 1cadi ng members of Congress makes
rejection of their advice a dangerous course (Halperin, 1972,

310-311). The acceptance of the military role suggests that the
Kennedy administration may have learned not to trust experts,
but not -how to go
. about it.
Task/Interperson al Orientation. The interpersonal orientation of the group during the Bay of Pigs \!las rep 1aced by a task
orientation of the ExCom.

Three forces operated to alter the

orientation of the group.

First, over time the group sought a

balance of orientation . Hith a previously heavy interpe1·sona·1
orientation , the group sought the bal ance necessary for cohes iveness by instituting greater task emphasis.

Second, follO\·ling

the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Kennedy administration came under
heavy a.nd continuous political attack for its handling of the
operation.

External criticism of an interpersona lly ori ented

group's faflure \'Jill tesult in a greater task orientation.

Third,

t he miss-ile crisis \'tas a period of greater stress than the Bay of
Pigs.

The stress faced by the ExCom could be expected to increase

task orientation.

Thus, we can expect the ExCom to have operated

in a manner more indi cative of task orientation.
As has been noted earlier, task ori entation i s characterized
by cl ear power differenti als and a critical focus on the job at
hand.

As we have seen, the etiquette of the ExCom refl ected the

ch a\~act eristi cs

of task emphasis.

Janis sees the more open and

critical approach of ExCom to be the res ult of a qroup norm that
i s the l egacy of the Bay of Pigs.
87

I offer an expl anation of the

force behind that norm: the task orientation resulting from
external criticism of an interpersonal orientation.
The Desirability to Exercise Power
A focus upon the task, especially so important a task,
provides the individual \'lith greater desire to exercise power.
An interpersonal orientation pits the desire to move the group

to.1ards a pal·ticular policy option against the larger priority
of maintaining close interpersonal relationships.

A task

orientation poses no confl ·ict for the individual since the
desire to move the

gl~oup

tovtards a parti cul al· po 1icy option

is consistent vtith the priority of solving the pl·oblem at hand.

Robert Kennedy said,

11

Each one of us was being asked to make

a recommendntion whi ch v10uld affect the futw·e of all mankind,
C.l.

1·econrnendation Hhi ch, if vtrong and if accepted, could mean

til e

destruct-ion of the human race 11 (R.

Kennedy~ 44).

they took t he respons ibility to act because of the
consequences of inaction.

In

shor·t,

Sel~ious

They be lieved it mattered how they

chose •.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The successful application of the facts, as we knm'l them,
regarding the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis into a
theory of group decision-making supports the theory.

The process

model seems to be an adequate tool for understanding the events
surr ounding these t\'IO deci s·ions.
1·1oreover, it is difficult to understand how an analysis of
these decisions could reasonably i gnore the factors isolated
in the process mode 1.

Does the Bay of Pigs deci s ion make sense

without an unders tanding of the CIA's exercise of oower?

Does

the s i1 ence of other potent ia 1 pov1er exercisers make s ense
without the concepts of etiquette, roles, and interpet-sonal
o t'i<~n tations?

Does the reference

pm·H~r

of blockade suppot•ters

aiel in the understan ding of how the blockade alternative v-tas
adopted?

Does the open conf lict of the missile crisis deci si on

group make sense in contras t vii th the ass umed consensus of the
Bay of Pigs group

per ceptions?

\<J i

thout an un de rstanding of i nterpersona 1

In sho rtt the answer I would provide is that

poli tical decisions cnn be understood only by vi ewi ng the proces s

of how they
. evo l ved.
~--·

The li mitations of avai l ab le f acts pose serious cha l lenges
fot' someone attempting a process analysis.

The dominance of the

"rational actor model" as the mode of political analysis leads
in s·idm~s

to wri te not of t he detn"il s of t he deci s·ion process, but
09

of the reasons for the decision.

In short, the details of who

said what to \·thorn and vii th \'lhat impact are often overlooked.
But the dominance of the "rational actor model" has its advantages.

Not recognizing the importance of the details of decision

process, sympathetic insiders \'lill often betray themselves by
disclosing \•lh at they think of as a hannless detail.

For example,

the disclos ure by Sorensen and Schl esi nger of the perceived
threat to the Kennedy image of toughnes s and determination posed
by inaction in eithe r the Bay of Pigs or the Cuban

l~ i s sile

Crisis

is a little- noticed det ail of great importance if seen within the
framework of the proces s model .

Rega1·dless of hov1 many such

detail s exist, we will probab ly wish to remain open to future data.
Accordingly, no analysis can ever be final in the sense of being
cloc;ed t o f uture

t~evision s

or changes.

The real question is

whethe r enough informat·ion exis ts to n1ake a prof i table anal ys is.
I think enough i nfor·mation exi s ts on t he deci s ions di scussed he t·e.
The Bay of Pins anti the Cuban

l~i ss il e

crisi s decisions indicate

th at Presidents, like other mortals , are s ubject to power exerci se
und perceptual l imitations.

The i mage of the l onely President paci ng

outside the F1·ench windov1s of the

l~lhite

the fate of the world i s a fal se image.

House deciding in sol i t ude
Pres idents decide in

crO\'Idedt smoke .. f ill ed rooms j ust like other mortals.

Presi dents

cxerdse pm'ier by vi rtuc of t he·i r posi t·i on and the re\'Jards and
puni shments t hat position grants t hem.

Pres idents al s o exercise

powe r based on the i r personalities and ski ll s.

And, of course ,

Presidents arc s ubject to t he pm,te t· exercised by their advi sors .
90

They decide \'lith their ·a dvisors 1 advice and consent.
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